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I. Introduction
Arbitration has its roots deep in antiquity1 and has long
enjoyed widespread use in the United States and across the globe.2
In essence, it is a contractual form of dispute resolution used
primarily as an alternative to litigation.3 The parties to a dispute
1. See John T. Blackenship, Isomorphism of Construction Arbitration: The
Key to Its Prevention and Reversal, 65-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 114, 116 (2010)
(tracing the history of arbitration to Ancient Babylon and Greece).
2. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution
Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1339–40 (2007) (documenting the
increasing importance of arbitration in international business relationships).
3. See Paul Bennett IV, Note, “Waiving” Goodbye to Arbitration: A
Contractual Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2012) (“[A]rbitration

EXCEEDING THEIR POWERS

1573

agree to argue the issue before a neutral third-party arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators and to be legally bound to honor the
arbitrator’s decision.4 The parties decide how arbitrators are
selected,5 and they control which issues will be resolved and which
rules shall be applied to resolve them.6 Agreements to arbitrate are
construed liberally to encompass almost any possible claim arising
under them.7 These agreements, then, can even encompass
statutory claims relating to public regulation and civil rights,8
including discrimination claims.9 While the prevalence of
is a private, alternative adjudicatory forum to which one gains access by
contract” (citations omitted)); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 425–433 (1988) (noting that arbitration is a
“creature of contract” and a popular alternative to litigation).
4. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of ArbitrationA Preliminary
Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952)
The four essential aspects of arbitration are: (1) it is resorted to only
by agreement of the parties; (2) it is a method not of compromising
disputes but of deciding them; (3) the person making the decision has
no formal connection with our system of courts; but (4) before the
award is known it is agreed to be “final and binding.”
(citation omitted); Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 428–30 (explaining the
arbitration process).
5. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a
method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such
method shall be followed . . . .”).
6. See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“[P]arties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which
they will arbitrate, . . . so too may they specify by contract the rules under which
that arbitration will be conducted.”).
7. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987) (“[The] duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a
party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (“[W]e find no warrant in the [FAA] for implying in every contract within
its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”). The Supreme
Court has also remarked that there is nothing preventing parties from
specifying in their agreements that statutory claims are not within the scope of
arbitrability. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (“Nothing, in the
meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of
an agreement to arbitrate.”).
9. There is a caveat here: while courts will generally interpret broadly
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arbitration agreements varies by context,10 it cannot be disputed
that arbitration itself is an enormously important component in
the field of contractual relationships, particularly commercial
transactions.11 Considering the high stakes often involved in
contemporary arbitration, any uncertainty regarding the validity
of arbitral awards is at best frustrating and at worst disastrous.
Courts have long struggled to develop a stable framework for
review and recognition of arbitral awards.12 Early arbitral review
worded arbitration agreements to encompass all disputes arising under the
contract or submission, in order for a discrimination claim to be submitted to
arbitration, the agreement must specifically mention that such claims are
included. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (“We hold that a
collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”).
10. Arbitration agreements are commonly found in commercial deals,
including both traditional business-to-business transactions as well as consumer
transactions. They are also prevalent in employment contracts and the
construction industry. For a discussion on arbitration agreements in consumer
transactions, see Joseph M. Matthews, Consumer Arbitration: Is It Working
Now and Will It Work in the Future?, 79-APR FLA. B.J. 22 (2005). For a
discussion of employment arbitration, see Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al.,
Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133 (2012). For a
discussion of construction arbitration, see Greg Harwell, Arbitration of
Construction Claims: Unique Issues and Current Topics, 25 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS)
72 (2003).
11. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peebles, Commercial Arbitration in
Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
343, 348 (1995)
Increasing numbers of more complex commercial disputes, involving
larger amounts in controversy, are being routinely submitted to
arbitration. A substantial number of commercial contracts contain
boilerplate arbitration clauses providing that virtually all
controversies arising between the parties to those contracts will be
subject to final and binding arbitration. Thus, for example,
agreements to arbitrate contractual and related disputes are
routinely included in sales contracts, construction contracts, brokercustomer contracts, loan agreements, partnership agreements, and
employment and employment-related contracts.
(citations omitted).
12. Before the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), federal courts
lacked any determinative rule governing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 125 (1924)
(“[W]e have no occasion to consider whether the unwillingness of federal courts
to give full effect to executory agreements for arbitration can be justified.”).
After the FAA guaranteed the enforceability of arbitration agreements,
questions arose as to the scope of its provisions for vacatur of awards, as well as
the exclusivity of those provisions. Infra Part II.
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in this country was often characterized by judicial suspicion of
the procedural protections and legal competence provided by
arbitration proceedings.13 Many courts were willing to vacate
awards for any number of reasons, including the court’s belief
that the arbitrator had misapplied the applicable law or drawn
an incorrect legal conclusion.14
The lack of coherency in the enforcement of arbitral awards
was a driving force behind the passage of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)15 in 1925. With this statute, Congress sought to
provide a nationwide framework for the evaluation and
enforcement of arbitral awards.16 But questions about the nature
and scope of judicial vacatur remain unanswered to this day,
particularly regarding substantive review and the notion of
“manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for vacatur.17
Although a universally accepted definition has proven
elusive,18 manifest disregard is colloquially the notion that a court
may vacate an arbitral award when a party can show that the
arbitrator was aware of the applicable law but ignored it and
applied a different standard when making her decision.19 The use
13. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
480 (1989) (describing the “old judicial hostility to arbitration”); Bennett, supra
note 3, at 1623 (“Prior to the FAA, opportunities to bargain for arbitral
procedures were severely constricted. Considered nothing more than tools of
oppression, courts generally nullified arbitration agreements and assumed
jurisdiction over the matter in question.” (citations omitted)).
14. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349–50 (1854) (stating that an
award may be vacated for “gross mistake, either apparent on the face of the
award, or to be made out by evidence”).
15. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
16. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1923) (statement of
Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Comm. of the New York
Chamber of Commerce) (“The fundamental conception underlying the law is to
make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”).
17. See James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan:
American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party
Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 2–6 (2007) [hereinafter Unraveling]
(describing the creation of the manifest disregard doctrine and its current
treatment).
18. See infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (detailing the different
formulations of manifest disregard employed by the federal appellate courts).
19. See, e.g., Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“[A]n arbitrator acts with manifest disregard if ‘(1) the applicable
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of manifest disregard as a concrete doctrine took hold after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan,20 yet substantive
judicial review of arbitral awards is much older.21 Recent Supreme
Court precedent suggests, however, that manifest disregard may
no longer provide a valid ground for vacatur under federal law.22 A
circuit split has developed over the continued viability of manifest
disregard.23
legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and
(2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.’” (quoting Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)));
Matthew Wolper, “Manifest Disregard”: Not Yet Entirely Disregarded, 86-OCT
FLA. B.J. 36, 37 (2012) (defining manifest disregard as “when an arbitrator is
advised of the law, recognizes its applicability, and consciously disregards it”
(citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461–62 (11th Cir.
1997))).
20. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
21. James M. Gaitis traces the concept’s history back to Justice Story’s
opinion in Klein v. Catara, 14 F.Cas. 732 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1814). Gaitis,
Unraveling, supra note 17, at 17–23. But this case and its progeny focused on
the distinction between restricted and unrestricted submissions to arbitration:
restricted submissions somehow limit the arbitrator’s authority to resolve the
dispute, while unrestricted submissions grant the arbitrator “carte blanche
authority” to resolve the dispute however she sees fit, regardless of any
applicable legal or equitable principles. Id. at 17. An award could be vacated
only for a mistake in the application of law if the submission was restricted to
that particular body of law, or in an unrestricted submission if the arbitrator
chose to apply that particular law and did so incorrectly. Id. at 19–20. The
current manifest disregard standard has abandoned the restricted–unrestricted
distinction and focuses instead on the arbitrator’s knowledge of a binding legal
principle and subsequent refusal to apply it. See id. at 54 (“[C]ourts continually
have concluded that in using the word ‘disregard’ in Wilko, the Supreme Court
could have only meant to describe an intentional act by arbitrators.”); supra
note 19 (describing the current manifest disregard standard).
22. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the viability of manifest
disregard. See James M. Gaitis, Clearing the Air on “Manifest Disregard” and
Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration: A Reconciliation of Wilko, Hall Street,
and Stolt-Nielsen, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 21, 21–22 (2011) [hereinafter Clearing
the Air] (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to rule on manifest disregard). The
Court has, however, called the doctrine into serious question with its ruling in
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), causing
several federal circuits to abandon manifest disregard. See Christopher Walsh,
Stolt-Nielsen’s Comfort for the ‘Average Arbitrator’: An Analysis of the Post-Hall
Street ‘Manifest Disregard’ Award Review Standard, 27 ALTS. TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 19, 19–21 (2009) (explaining Hall Street’s effect on manifest disregard and
lower federal courts’ reactions to the case).
23. Infra Part III.C.
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This Note attempts to ameliorate some of the confusion over
manifest disregard by proposing a new framework for evaluating
arbitrators’ determination and application of rules governing
disputes submitted to arbitration. The framework seeks to
harmonize the stated goals of arbitration, concerns about
arbitrator overreaching and unfairness, and recent confusing
Supreme Court precedent. The goal pursued is a compromise
between two opposing viewpoints on the courts’ role in
arbitration: the view that courts must be allowed to monitor
arbitration in order to prevent abuse or egregious mistakes,24 and
the view that arbitration must remain separate from litigation
and unrestrained by judicial imposition.25
The Note begins by providing a brief outline of the history
and goals behind both the manifest disregard doctrine and
arbitration generally in Part II.26 Part III analyzes the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,27
which cast serious doubt on manifest disregard’s continued
24. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error: Replacing “Manifest
Disregard” with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 87, 126 (2012) (“[F]ederal courts [should] apply plenary review for
errors of law when either federal statutory rights or federal public policy is at
stake.”); Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest
Disregard” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 187 (2011) (“[J]udicial review must be
available to correct an arbitrator’s intentional flouting of the law. If the
standard is eliminated, arbitral finality will rise above the crowning principle of
the American constitutional system: ‘No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law.’” (citations omitted)); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 518
(1998) (“Judicial review of arbitration awards must be sufficient at least to
require arbitrators to follow the general outlines of the law. An award should be
vacated or modified if it shows an extraordinary lack of fidelity to established
legal principles or an egregious departure from established law.”).
25. See, e.g., Albert G. Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It! Now What?, 29-SUM
VT. B.J. 39, 45 (2003) [hereinafter The Arbitrator Blew It!] (claiming that
manifest disregard transforms arbitration into “not an alternative to litigation,
but rather the first step of the law suit”); Kevin Patrick Murphy, Alive But Not
Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 44 GA. L. REV. 285, 314 (2009)
(“Removing manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur makes judicial
enforcement more predictable and, thus, less necessary.”); Hans Smit, Hall
Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 513, 520
(2008) [hereinafter Critical Comment] (arguing against an expanded role for the
courts in the arbitration system).
26. See infra Part II (discussing the goals and history of arbitration and
manifest disregard in the U.S.).
27. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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viability, as well as the federal circuit split that has formed as a
result of that decision.28 Part III also discusses the more recent
Supreme Court case Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.,29 which indicated that some manner of
substantive arbitral award review must be available to courts.30
Part IV introduces the Note’s solution to the circuit split: a new
framework for judicial substantive review of arbitral awards.31
The framework presents six questions for a judge to ask while
reviewing an arbitrator’s decision.32 This Note concludes that
very limited substantive review should be available to parties
challenging an arbitral award, but only if the strict requirements
described in the framework are met.33 The manifest disregard
doctrine is shown to be both overinclusive and underinclusive and
must be modified as indicated in the review framework.34
II. Background: Historic and Contemporary Views of Arbitration
and Manifest Disregard
To understand the controversy over award review and
vacatur, one must understand the history and goals of arbitration
itself, as well as the roots of manifest disregard. The difficulty in
reconciling one with the other stems from the inherent tension
between their goals. Arbitration, on the one hand, seeks finality
and expediency, while manifest disregard, on the other, seeks
accuracy through substantive review.

28. See infra Parts III.A, III.C (discussing Hall Street and the current
federal circuit split over manifest disregard).
29. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
30. See infra Part III.B (discussing Stolt-Nielsen).
31. See infra Part IV (describing a new framework for analyzing
substantive challenges to arbitral awards).
32. See infra Part V.B (introducing the six-question review framework).
33. See infra Part VI (concluding that limited substantive review of arbitral
awards should be available).
34. See infra Part VI (describing the inadequacies of the manifest disregard
doctrine).
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A. The Goals and History of Arbitration in the United States
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
arbitration enjoyed an important, albeit limited, role in
commercial transactions.35 The enforceability of arbitral awards
was not certain, though, in part due to the courts’ frequent
refusals to honor arbitration agreements or enforce arbitral
awards.36
During this time period, the finality of arbitration was
extremely questionable. The Supreme Court made it clear that
arbitral awards could be properly reviewed for any “such reasons
as are sufficient in other courts,” including “manifest mistake of
law.”37
Congress sought to ameliorate perceived judicial hostility
toward arbitration, at the time embodied by the “ouster
doctrine,”38 and to make arbitration a reliable dispute-resolution
35. See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration
in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 247–48 (1928) (explaining that before
the FAA was enacted, state laws on arbitration varied with regard to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, limiting arbitration’s desirability).
36. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1898) (“While
parties may impose, as condition precedent to applications to the courts, that
they shall first have settled the amount to be recovered by an agreed mode, they
cannot entirely close the access to the courts of law. The law, and not the
contract, prescribes the remedy . . . .”); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trin. Lake
Petroleum Co., 22 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (“[T]he Supreme Court has laid
down the rule that such a complete ouster of jurisdiction as is shown by the
clause quoted from the charter parties is void in a federal forum.”). Judicial
hostility toward arbitration was apparent even decades after the FAA’s passage.
See Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Charles W. Ackerman of Fla., Inc., 219 So. 2d 110,
113 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (“Traditionally, agreements to arbitrate have been
strictly construed because they have the effect of ousting a court of competent
jurisdiction of the authority to determine a question initially which will arise in
the future.”).
37. United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 420 (1874).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924). The “ouster doctrine” was a
principle used by courts to invalidate forum selection clauses in contracts. See In
re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. L.L.C., 251 S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. App.
2008) (explaining the ouster doctrine and tracing its origin to Ins. Co. v. Morse,
87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874)). Arbitration agreements were invalidated alongside
forum selection clauses because they removed disputes from all courts’
jurisdictions. See Patricia Patterson, In re AIU Insurance Company, 41-SPG
TEX. J. BUS. L. 101, 102–03 (2005) (“[U]nder the ‘ouster doctrine,’ advance
agreements regarding forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses, and venue
clauses were considered illegal and void.”). The ouster doctrine posited that
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mechanism for parties seeking to avoid litigation.39 The Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) created a federal framework providing for
enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal district court.40
If a federal court finds a valid arbitration agreement between the
parties, the FAA requires the court to stay all proceedings and
order the parties to arbitration.41 The FAA preempts any
conflicting state laws invalidating agreements to arbitrate or
state laws restricting arbitration more than other contracts,42 and
its reach covers all agreements to arbitrate in commercial and
maritime contracts43 and agreements to arbitrate in all
employment contracts except those of transportation workers.44
because “every citizen has a right to resort to all courts of the country,” then
although a citizen may waive his rights in specific instances, he may not “bind
himself by an agreement . . . thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all
occasions.” Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
39. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)
(“Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with
a national policy favoring it and placing arbitration agreements on equal footing
with all other contracts.” (internal quotes omitted)).
40. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making agreements to arbitrate “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (explaining that the FAA created both procedural and
substantive federal arbitration law).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
42. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 340 U.S. 64 (1938), federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law unless
the controversy is governed by the U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress.
State courts and federal courts sitting in diversity cases cannot apply federal
procedural law. The FAA is not merely a procedural statute, though. It creates
federal substantive arbitration law as well as procedural arbitration law, and
both federal and state courts must apply its substantive components. Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
FAA preemption of state law is an important topic for this Note, and will be
discussed more thoroughly infra Part IV.D.2–4. It is now settled law that the
FAA preempts any state law governing arbitration that singles out arbitration
agreements for invalidation. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008)
(holding that the FAA preempted a California law vesting primary jurisdiction
to resolve disputes between talent agents and artists to the state’s labor
commission); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79
IND. L.J. 393, 394 n.2 (2004) (providing a list of cases in which state laws
regulating arbitration agreements were held preempted by the FAA).
43. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (establishing the Act’s jurisdiction over agreements to
arbitrate “in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce”).
44. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (“Section 1
exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation
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Disputes in those contexts can be arbitrated even when they
involve statutorily created rights.45 Thus, the overwhelming
majority of arbitrations in the United States fall under its
scope.46 The FAA does not, however, actually confer federal
jurisdiction.47 The FAA also provides the structural and
substantive framework for the Uniform Law Commission’s
Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act,48 on which forty-nine states have based their own arbitration
statutes.49
If the FAA was created to increase the use and acceptance of
arbitration as an alternative to litigation, it has been a success.
Arbitration clauses are found in a large portion of consumer50 and
workers.”).
45. See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987)
(holding that agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1934
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act are valid).
46. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (per curiam)
(stating that the FAA’s jurisdiction extends as far as Congress’s Commerce
Clause Power under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution); Satomi
Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, L.L.C., 225 P.3d 213, 219 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)
(holding that the FAA preempted a Washington statute invalidating an
arbitration clause between a condominium developer and a homeowners’
association); Benjamin D. Tievsky, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act After
Alafabco: A Case Analysis, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 675, 706–07 (2010)
(analyzing the expansive reach of the FAA’s jurisdiction after the Alafabco
decision).
47. A party seeking federal review of an arbitration agreement or award
under the FAA must meet federal subject-matter jurisdiction requirements. See
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009) (stating that the FAA does not
confer federal jurisdiction).
48. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s
Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2002) (“The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) prescribe a
nearly identical ‘arbitration law’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
49. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Acts: Arbitration
Act (2000), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (2014), http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (providing the text of
the UAA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA) was promulgated in 1956 and adopted by 49 states. Id. It
was revised in 2000, and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) has thus
far been adopted in sixteen states. Id.
50. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56 (2004) (noting the increased
prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts).

1582

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571 (2014)

employment contracts,51 and have been historically common in
business transactions.52 Arbitration proceedings have also become
available to resolve disputes involving statutory rights, including
civil rights.53 For better or worse, arbitration is a key component
in our domestic dispute-resolution framework, and has expanded
beyond its contract origins to hold an indomitable place in dispute
resolution.54
Throughout arbitration’s history in the United States,
proponents have lauded its asserted advantages over litigation,
including cost-efficiency, finality of the decision, speed, arbitrator
expertise, privacy, and greater control over the proceedings.55
Some judicial suspicion of the relatively unsupervised nature of
51. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 137 (documenting an
increase in the use of arbitration agreements in Chief Executive Officer
employment contracts).
52. See Note, Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1022, 1025 (1948) [hereinafter Predictability of Result] (“By far the
largest number of awards studied concerned mercantile questions.”).
53. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 266 (2009) (“This ‘Court has
been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under
the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.’”
(quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001))); O’Hara
O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 146–47 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) for the proposition that “statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement”). Very few types of claims are
categorically nonarbitrable. Criminal offenses are the most significant
exception. See RICHARD A. LORD, 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:28 (4th ed.,
2012) (“Criminal offenses are not arbitrable, as they are matters of public
concern.” (citations omitted)).
54. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has “elevate[d] arbitration
provisions above all other contractual provisions”).
55. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 618–21 (citing expediency, cost efficiency,
and freedom to design procedures tailored to the parties’ needs as possible
benefits of choosing arbitration over litigation); Richard W. Naimark &
Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations
and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW 203, 203–04
(2002) (presenting a survey of clients and attorneys engaged in private
commercial arbitration ranking the clients’ and attorneys’ perceived advantages
of arbitration in order of importance); Predictability of Result, supra note 52, at
1022 (describing arbitration to be quicker than litigation if agreed upon before
the dispute arose); Philip G. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration Under the N.R.A.,
1 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425 (1934) (defining arbitration as the “adjudication of
disputes by private judges of the parties’ own choosing” and the “business man’s
substitute for trial”).
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arbitral proceedings persists, however. From time to time, courts
may seem unwilling to elevate the stated goals of arbitration over
their own perception that a mistake has been made in fashioning
the award.56 Parties left unsatisfied with an arbitrator’s decision
will often challenge it through litigation, hoping to convince a
court that mistake or malfeasance has occurred.
B. Arbitral Award Vacatur
Arbitral awards are generally not reviewable for mistakes of
The FAA contains four enumerated grounds granting
federal courts the authority to vacate an arbitral award.58 A court
may vacate when it finds that the award was “procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means”; when it finds “evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; when the arbitrators
misbehave in a way that prejudices a party’s rights; or when the
arbitrators exceed their powers.59 These grounds tend to focus on
law.57

56. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir.
1998) (overturning an arbitral award because the court found that the
arbitrators “ignored the law or the evidence or both”); Montes v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (vacating an arbitral
award because one of the parties had expressly urged the arbitrator to disregard
the applicable law and the court believed that the facts did not adequately
support the award).
57. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008)
(stating that courts cannot provide “general review for an arbitrator’s legal
errors”).
58. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).
59. Id. The full text of the provision reads:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
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the fairness and impartiality of the arbitration proceeding itself,
rather than the reasonableness or propriety of the resulting
award.
The general lack of substantive-review allowance in the FAA
reflects the broader goal that arbitral awards be final60 and be
governed by the parties’ agreement.61 If arbitral awards can be
readily reviewed on substantive grounds, then a de facto appeals
process will be built into the system. This would, in turn,
frustrate arbitration’s goals of expediency and finality.62 Recent
Supreme Court precedent suggests, though, that some limited
form of substantive review should be available.63

subject matter submitted was not made.
60. See St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.
2005) (noting that there is a “strong federal policy favoring certainty and finality
in arbitration”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Berry, 92 F.
App’x 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear that the FAA reflects Congressional
approval of the speed and finality of arbitration . . . .”); Kar Nut Prods. Co. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local
337, No. 92-2084, 1993 WL 304467, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1993) (“Our
deference to the judgments of arbitrators is to promote the finality of
arbitration.” (citing Bakers Union Factory No. 326 v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co.,
Inc., 749 F.2d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 1984))); Naimark & Keer, supra note 55, at 204
(noting that 32% of arbitration participants surveyed cited “finality” as one of
their top three reasons for arbitrating their dispute).
61. The FAA was enacted specifically to guarantee that agreements to
arbitrate were enforced. See Gaitis, Unraveling, supra note 17, at 42 (quoting
Representative Graham during the 1924 Joint Hearings before the Senate and
House Subcommittees on the Judiciary). The arbitration agreement necessarily
includes the sacrifice of some of the substantive and procedural rights available
through litigation in order to achieve the benefits cited in the Naimark & Keer
article, supra note 55, at 204. See Davis, supra note 24, at 88 (elaborating on the
procedural rights commonly forfeited in arbitration proceedings). Finality is also
viewed as a common reason for resorting to arbitration. See United Food &
Commercial Workers Union v. Pilgrims Pride Corp., 193 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir.
1999) (“Intrusive review of arbitration awards by the courts would undermine
the federal policy favoring labor arbitration. Such review would destroy the
bargained-for finality of arbitration . . . .”).
62. Once an arbitral award is challenged, not only will the parties have to
litigate in a district court, they will likely have to re-arbitrate the dispute if the
award is vacated. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time
within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”)
63. See infra notes 217–24 and accompanying text (describing the
implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen).
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C. Summary and History of Manifest Disregard
Courts have long been adept at finding ways to grant
substantive review of arbitral decisions. The most common and
perhaps most controversial method of achieving such review has
been the manifest disregard doctrine.64 This doctrine purports to
allow judicial vacatur of an award when a party can demonstrate
that, when fashioning the award, the arbitrator intentionally
ignored the clearly applicable law.65
The intent of the arbitrator to ignore law that she perceives
to be controlling is often a necessary component in a finding of
manifest disregard; most courts attempt to distinguish between a
“mere” mistake in law and manifest disregard, and the
distinction often requires that the misapplication of law be
egregious and with knowledge of how the law should be applied.66
64. See supra note 56 (citing cases applying the doctrine); see also Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P, 813 A.2d 621, 633 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (vacating for manifest disregard of the law and
contravention of public policy an arbitral decision awarding payment for medical
services to a then-unlicensed medical facility in clear violation of the applicable
New Jersey statute); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 274
(App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003) (vacating a punitive damages arbitral award because
the court found it to be in manifest disregard of the law); Walsh, supra note 22,
at 19 (“[I]t has been recognized since the 1950s that arbitration awards may be
vacated if the award displays a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”).
65. This statement is a generalization of the manifest disregard doctrine as
it appears in most circumstances. See Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T.
Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389–90 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A party seeking
vacatur [for manifest disregard of the law] bears the burden of proving that the
arbitrators were fully aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal
principle, but refused to apply it, in effect, ignoring it.”). The court goes on to
identify three necessary components of a manifest disregard showing: first, that
the law was clear and explicitly applicable to the dispute before the arbitrators;
second, that the applicable law was misapplied; and third, that the arbitrator
was subjectively aware of the governing law yet did not apply it. Id. at 389–90.
In reality, as will be further discussed, there is no universally accepted
definition of manifest disregard, and courts have increasingly been using the
term to either restate or expand upon the enumerated grounds for vacatur
found in § 10 of the FAA, particularly the fourth, which allows vacatur when the
arbitrator exceeds his powers. Infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
66. Duferco Int’l Steel Trading, 333 F.3d at 390; see also Montes v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997) (“An arbitration
board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it. It
has simply made a legal mistake. To manifestly disregard the law, one must be
conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.”).
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The inherent difficulty in distinguishing what sort of
misapplications would rise to the level of manifest disregard is
apparent, and state67 and federal courts have been unable to
67. Although the focus of this Note is federal arbitral award review, it is
worth noting that many state courts recognize the manifest disregard doctrine.
See Design Tech, LLC v. Moriniere, No. CV126006844S, 2012 WL 3870313, at
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012) (“Our courts have held that claims of
manifest disregard of the law fall within the statutory proscription of [CONN.
GEN. STAT.] § 52-418(a)(4).”); Geissler v. Sanem, 949 P.2d 234, 238 (Mont. 1997)
(holding that “this and future arbitration awards may be reviewed for a
manifest disregard of the law”); Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 131 P.3d 5, 7 (Nev. 2006) (“We have previously recognized that a private
arbitration award may be reviewed . . . [and vacated when] the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law.”); Xtria L.L.C. v. Int’l Ins. Alliance Inc., 286
S.W.3d 583, 594 (Tex. App. 2009) (“Under [the manifest disregard] standard, the
arbitrator recognizes a clearly governing principle and ignores it.” (citation
omitted)). Other states have either expressly rejected manifest disregard, see
Comerica Bank v. Howsam, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t
is unclear whether the manifest disregard of the law ground remains as basis
for vacatur in federal court. . . . But one thing is clear: an arbitrator’s manifest
disregard of the law is not a ground for vacatur under California law.”), or have
remained ambivalent and refused to take a stance on it. See Abdelnour v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 540, 540 n.5
(Mass. Super. 2012) (“It is unclear whether [manifest disregard] is recognized in
Massachusetts as an additional ground for vacating an award.”).
State courts often look to federal precedent when applying the doctrine. See
ABCO Builders, Inc. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc., 647 S.E.2d 574, 575 (Ga.
2007) (“Because our state arbitration code closely tracks federal arbitration law,
we look to federal cases for guidance in construing our own statutes.”); Wein &
Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 480–81 (N.Y. 2006) (holding
that courts may “modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard
of the law” (citing Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333
F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003))). The Georgia Supreme Court in Progressive
Plumbing cited Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461
(11th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that “[t]o manifestly disregard the law, one
must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.” Id. As this Note will
show, the federal precedent governing substantive review of arbitral awards is
confusing and split, so resolving the issue at the federal level may influence
state courts applying their own review procedures. The reader should remember
that the review structure proposed by this Note is based on substantive review
under the FAA, which only applies to federal courts. This is because the FAA
grounds for review on which this Note’s framework is based, §§ 10–11, do not
preempt state arbitration law. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 82
Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 244 (Cal. 2008) (stating that only § 2 of the FAA applies in
state court proceedings, and that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are directed only at
federal courts). State courts apply their own arbitration law when reviewing
awards, as long as the state law is not preempted by § 2 of the FAA. See, e.g.,
Nordstrom v. Russo & Steele, L.L.C., No. 1 CA–CV 11–0632, 2012 WL 2477678,
at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 21, 2012) (applying state law mandating that
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apply such vague standards consistently.68 This inconsistency is
especially troubling because some courts allow the arbitrator’s
subjective intent to be inferred from the circumstances.69 Because
the arbitrator’s intentional disregard of controlling law tends to
be the only clear distinction between a “mere mistake of law” and
manifest disregard, inferring this intent from the circumstances
hinges the whole review process on the reviewing court’s
subjective opinion of the mistake’s enormity or the arbitrator’s
actual knowledge of the law.
James M. Gaitis has persuasively argued that the concepts
underlying manifest disregard have their roots in early
arbitration common law.70 But the emergence of manifest
disregard as a specific doctrine of award vacatur can be traced
directly to a small portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wilko v. Swan.71 That case, which has since been overruled, dealt
with the question of whether an arbitration agreement contained
appellate review of arbitral awards be available, despite a provision in the
arbitration agreement waiving the right to such review, and reasoning that the
FAA did not preempt state law because no federal decision has held this type of
state law unenforceable); Wright v. City of Gary, 963 N.E.2d 637, 645 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012) (applying manifest disregard within Indiana’s arbitration law).
68. See infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (describing the
application of the manifest disregard standard among the federal circuits).
69. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 92–93
(2d Cir. 2008) (stating that a court may infer an arbitrator’s knowledge of a
controlling principle if the arbitrator’s decision “strains credulity or does not rise
to the standard of barely colorable” (citing Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor
Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted))), rev’d
on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
70. See Gaitis, Clearing the Air, supra note 22, at 27 (claiming that the
Wilko Court’s suggestion of manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur was
based on prior American and English case law allowing for vacatur when the
arbitrator misapplied the governing law); Gaitis, Unraveling, supra note 17, at
16–17 (arguing that the Wilko Court found the FAA to incorporate traditional
American arbitration common law, which allowed substantive review for
mistakes in the application of law).
71. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C, 300 F.
App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (“It is worth noting that since Wilko, every federal
appellate court has allowed the vacatur of an award based on an arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of the law.”); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d
1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Wilko for the proposition that “although an
erroneous interpretation of the law would not subject an arbitration award to
reversal, a clear disregard for the law would”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Wilko as the
source of manifest disregard in the Second Circuit).
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in a securities brokerage contract was an illegal waiver of a
party’s right, under the Securities Act of 1933,72 to recover in
state or federal court for misrepresentation.73 In dicta, the Court
stated that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”74 In support
of this statement, the Court referenced several nineteenthcentury cases applying substantive review to awards for an
arbitrator’s mistake in the application of law that rose above a
mere mistake in judgment.75
As Gaitis points out, the Wilko Court’s references to older,
pre-FAA cases have been largely forgotten, and courts as well as
scholars have generally traced the manifest disregard doctrine to
the Wilko dicta.76 The first attempt to define what the Wilko
Court meant by “manifest disregard” arose in the Ninth Circuit’s
San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay
Terminals Ltd.77 decision, although the court did not officially
adopt the standard.78 Citing Wilko, the court concluded that
manifest disregard
72. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (“Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations
of the Commission shall be void.”).
73. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953), overruled by Rodrigues de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
74. Id. at 436–37 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 437 n.24 (citing United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 413, 419–
21 (1874); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854); and Klein v. Catara, 14 F.
Cas. 732, 735 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1814)).
76. See Weathers P. Bolt, Much Ado About Nothing: The Effect of Manifest
Disregard on Arbitration Agreement Decisions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 161, 164 (2011)
(“Courts continued to recognize the strict rules of the FAA regarding vacatur
until the Supreme Court opened the door to possibly recognizing non-statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitration award in Wilko.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)); Davis, supra note 24, at 89 (tracing the creation of the
manifest disregard in the federal circuits to the Wilko opinion); Gaitis, Clearing
the Air, supra note 22, at 23 (“Prior to the advent of the twenty-first century,
arbitration law commentators almost universally and incorrectly surmised that
the manifest disregard concept originated in the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Wilko v. Swan.” (citations omitted)); supra note 71 (citing cases that
trace the manifest disregard doctrine to Wilko).
77. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
78. See id. at 801 (declining to adopt a standard of review for manifest
disregard of the law).
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must be something beyond and different from a mere error in
the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand
or apply the law. . . . We apprehend that a manifest disregard
of the law in the context of the language used in Wilko v.
Swan . . . might be present when arbitrators understand and
correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same.79

The Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to
clearly adopt the manifest disregard standard when it decided
Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc. in
1967.80 The Third Circuit followed suit in 1969 with its ruling in
Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher.81 The other
federal circuits, one by one, adopted the manifest disregard
standard throughout the remaining decades of the twentieth
century.82 The Fifth Circuit was the final holdout, adopting
manifest disregard in a 1999 decision, Williams v. Cigna
Financial Advisors Inc.83
By 2008, the year that the Supreme Court decided Hall
Street,84 every federal circuit had ostensibly adopted the doctrine.
Their use of the manifest disregard doctrine was far from
consistent, though. The federal circuit positions can be divided
roughly into two distinct camps, with a few outliers.
The first and larger camp consists of the circuits that allowed
a reviewing judge to somehow infer the arbitrator’s knowledge of
the governing law and intent to disregard it. The Second Circuit
applied probably the most lenient standard out of any circuit in
its Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.85 opinion. After stating that “we
doubt whether even under a strict construction of the meaning of
79. Id.
80. 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967). “[T]he Supreme Court has held in Wilko v.
Swan . . . that an award, based on ‘manifest disregard’ of the law, will not be
enforced . . . .” Id. at 582 (citing Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d at 801).
81. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969). “[I]nterpretations of labor arbitrators
must not be disturbed so long as they are not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the
law . . . .” Id. at 1128 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)).
82. For a complete listing of the cases in which the federal circuits adopted
the manifest disregard standard, see LeRoy, supra note 24, at 159.
83. 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled by Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc.
v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
84. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (describing the impact of
the Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision).
85. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
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manifest disregard, it is necessary for arbitrators to state that
they are deliberately ignoring the law,” the court went on to find
that the arbitrators did manifestly disregard the law based on
“strong evidence” supporting a conclusion opposite to the
arbitrators’ determination, along with “the agreement of the
parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the
applicable legal principles.”86 It is striking to note that this court
suggested not only manifest disregard of the law, but the
evidence as well, could serve as a ground for vacatur.87 The First
Circuit required that, in order for manifest disregard to be shown
without an express admission from the arbitrators that they
disregarded the law, “the governing law [must] have such
widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable
applicability that a court could assume the arbitrators knew the
rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug.”88 The Fourth
Circuit initially devoted little effort to explaining what it
considered manifest disregard to entail,89 but finally elucidated a
test in 2008 by requiring that the arbitration record show that
the applicable legal principle was clearly defined, not subject to
reasonable debate, and that the arbitrator refused to apply it.90
The Sixth Circuit also allowed a court to infer an arbitrator’s
subjective knowledge and disregard of applicable legal principles
if it determined that “no judge or group of judges could
conceivably come to the same determination as the arbitrator.”91
The second camp is composed of circuits that adopted a more
conservative form of manifest disregard and did not allow courts
to infer knowledge of governing law on the part of the arbitrator.
In order to show manifest disregard, the party had to conclusively
show that the arbitrator identified the governing law and yet
failed to apply it. The Eighth Circuit held this consistent,
86. Id. at 204.
87. Id. (“In view of the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of
his age and the agreement of the parties that the arbitrators were correctly
advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they
ignored the law or the evidence or both.”).
88. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990).
89. LeRoy, supra note 24, at 163.
90. Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 349–50 (4th Cir.
2008).
91. Id.
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conservative form of manifest disregard for two decades: “[A]n
arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where
the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and
then proceed to ignore it.”92 The Tenth Circuit applied a
formulation of manifest disregard that closely tracked the Eighth
Circuit’s conservative approach. It held manifest disregard to
mean “willful inattentiveness to governing law,”93 and to invoke
this standard, the “record [must] show the arbitrators knew the
law and explicitly disregarded it.”94 The Eleventh Circuit initially
refused to adopt manifest disregard at all.95 But by 1997, it too
had decided to apply the more conservative form of the doctrine.96
Several of the circuits did not fit neatly into those two
groups. These circuits took either unclear or singular positions.
The Third Circuit initially focused its examination on the
arbitration agreement itself, as opposed to governing law
identified in the agreement, stating that “only where there is a
manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by
principles of contract construct and the law of the shop, may a
reviewing court disturb the award.”97 This circuit later relied on a
definition in the negative: that manifest disregard was not an
“erroneous interpretation” of the law.98 The relatively few cases
addressing manifest disregard in the Third Circuit do not
definitively state whether a court could infer the arbitrator’s
knowledge. While the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to
articulate a standard for manifest disregard in Saguenay

92. Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th Cir. 1986)).
93. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted).
94. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001).
95. See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d
1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990) (“This court has never adopted the manifestdisregard-of-the-law standard; indeed, we have expressed some doubt as to
whether it should be adopted . . . .”).
96. See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur, defining it
using Black’s Law Dictionary, and stating that “[t]o manifestly disregard the
law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it”).
97. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).
98. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Terminals Ltd.,99 it did not actually adopt the doctrine until
1982,100 and it was not until 1995 that the court attempted to
further define standards for applying the doctrine.101 Although
the Ninth Circuit’s standard was fairly traditional, it also did not
state whether or not an arbitrator’s subjective knowledge of the
applicable law could be inferred.102 The Fifth Circuit suggested
perhaps the most liberal version of manifest disregard when it
stated that “where on the basis of the information available to the
court it is manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the
applicable law, the award should be upheld unless it would result
in a significant injustice.”103 Notice that this standard does not
consider the arbitrator’s subjective knowledge of the applicable
law, but instead requires the court, upon a finding of manifest
disregard, to determine whether upholding the award would
“result in [a] significant injustice.”104 The Seventh Circuit has
historically been critical of the manifest disregard doctrine.105 It
ostensibly applied the doctrine in its Wise v. Wachovia Securities,
LLC106 decision, but defined the doctrine so narrowly as to be
99. San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals
Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
100. See Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 682 F.2d
1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts are bound to defer to the conclusions of the
arbitrator unless the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law.”).
101. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.
1995) (“It must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the
applicable law and ignored it.” (citations omitted)). Before this case, the Ninth
Circuit had only applied the standard suggested in Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
which defined manifest disregard largely in the negative. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Tega-Rand Int’l, 740 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (defining manifest disregard
as “something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on
the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law” (quoting Saguenay
Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d at 801)).
102. The Ninth Circuit does not state that an arbitrator’s subjective
knowledge of applicable law and intent to disregard it can be inferred, but it
does cite the Second Circuit, which has allowed such an inference. See Mich.
Mut. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d at 832 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1986)).
103. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added).
104. Id. at 762.
105. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon, & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th
Cir. 1994) (claiming that the manifest disregard doctrine is either “inconsistent
with the entire law of arbitration” or “superfluous and confusing”).
106. 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006).
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superfluous.107 The D.C. Circuit adopted a rather lenient
standard, but one that appeared applicable only to statutory
rights. Stating that the “manifest disregard of the law standard
must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have
properly interpreted and applied statutory law,” the court seems
to have contemplated judicial review for a “mere error in law”
when dealing with arbitral awards implicating statutory
rights.108
So the state of manifest disregard was unclear even before
Hall Street. In its Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy109 decision, the First
Circuit listed several formulations of manifest disregard
standards used in other circuits.110 The court then claimed that
the differences were purely superficial: “However nattily
wrapped, the packages are fungible.”111 That claim’s accuracy is
questionable; the manifest disregard doctrine appeared confused
and inconsistent.112 Some circuits allowed the arbitrator’s
subjective knowledge and intent to be inferred from the
circumstances of the case.113 Others required explicit recognition
107. See id. at 268–69 (“[W]e have defined ‘manifest disregard of the law’ so
narrowly that it fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory
ground-‘where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.’ . . . For we have confined
it to cases in which the arbitrators ‘direct the parties to violate the law.’”
(quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.
2001))).
108. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see
also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (stating that an arbitrator’s
interpretation of the law is not reviewable); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Jarros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[M]anifest disregard of
the law is a very narrow standard of review. . . . A mere error in interpretation
or application of the law is insufficient.”); Thompson v. Tega-Rand Int’l, 740
F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Manifest disregard of the law has been defined as
‘something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the
part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.’” (quoting San Martine
Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminal Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th
Cir. 1961))).
109. 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (detailing the pre-2008
formulations of manifest disregard used in the federal circuits).
113. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (examining the First and
Second Circuits); supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (examining the
Fourth Circuit); supra note 103 and accompanying text (examining the Fifth
Circuit); supra note 91 and accompanying text (examining the Sixth Circuit);
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of applicableyet ignoredlegal principles.114 The Fifth Circuit
was apparently willing to vacate awards without even a showing
that the arbitrator was aware of the applicable law.115 The
Seventh Circuit refused to apply the substance of the doctrine,
yet still claimed to recognize manifest disregard.116 This
confusing situation became even murkier following the Supreme
Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc.117
III. Hall Street & The Current State of Manifest Disregard
A. The Hall Street Decision
The Hall Street case revolved around the validity of a clause
in the parties’ arbitration agreement purporting to require a
reviewing court to “vacate, modify, or correct any award if the
arbitrator’s conclusions of law were erroneous.”118 The petitioner,
Hall Street Associates, owned property that it had leased to the
respondent, Mattel.119 The lease required Mattel to indemnify
Hall Street for any damages resulting from either Mattel’s or its
predecessors’ failure to follow environmental laws while leasing
Hall Street’s property.120
The Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (Water Quality
Act)121 contained testing requirements that Mattel did not follow,
and it was eventually discovered that Mattel’s predecessor had
contaminated the property.122 Mattel sought to terminate the
lease, while Hall Street sued to enforce the indemnification
supra note 107 and accompanying text (examining the D.C. Circuit).
114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (examining the Eighth
Circuit); supra notes 93–94 (examining the Tenth Circuit); supra notes 95–96
and accompanying text (examining the Eleventh Circuit).
115. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
116. Supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
117. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Hall Street case).
118. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 576 (2008).
119. Id. at 579.
120. Id.
121. Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act, O.R.S. § 448.155 to 448.330
(2012).
122. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579.
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clause.123 The parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute and drew up
an agreement containing the above-mentioned judicial review
clause.124
The arbitrator found that Mattel was not required to
indemnify Hall Street because he did not believe that the Water
Quality Act was an environmental statute; he characterized it as
a human-health law.125 Hall Street sought review in federal court
pursuant to the judicial review clause. Hall Street claimed that
the arbitrator had made an erroneous conclusion of law and the
district court agreed, finding that the Water Quality Act was an
environmental law. The court vacated the award126 and on
remand, the arbitrator found for Hall Street.127 Mattel then
attacked the validity of the review clause itself, claiming that the
statutory grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA were exclusive.128
The Ninth Circuit,129 and then the Supreme Court,130 agreed
with Mattel. The Court held “that §§ 10 and 11 respectively
provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and
modification.”131 The clause in the arbitration agreement granting
expanded review to the court was invalid.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter rejected Hall Street’s
argument that judicial review beyond the FAA’s statutory
grounds has been available since the Wilko decision.132 Hall
Street argued that Wilko left open the possibility for such review,
particularly manifest disregard.133 If judges could expand review
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 580.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 580–81 (explaining that Mattel relied on the Ninth Circuit’s thenrecent ruling in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bach Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d
987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003)).
129. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476, 477–78
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the FAA’s grounds for vacatur are exclusive), rev’d
on other grounds, 552 U.S. 576, 592 (2008).
130. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008) (holding
that the statutory grounds listed under the FAA provide the exclusive grounds
for vacatur).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 584–85.
133. Id. at 584 (stating Hall Street took the position “that expandable
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beyond the enumerated grounds in the FAA, then, Hall Street
posited, parties should be able to expand upon those grounds as
well.134 The Supreme Court made it clear that neither judges nor
parties have such authority and questioned the validity of the
manifest disregard doctrine.135 Perhaps, the Court suggested,
manifest disregard as used in Wilko “merely referred to the § 10
grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. . . . Or, as some
courts have thought, ‘manifest disregard’ may have been
shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing
vacatur when the arbitrators were ‘guilty of misconduct’ or
‘exceeded their powers.’”136
To some, this case represented both a foray into new FAA
territory for the Court as well as a departure from precedent.137
Stuart M. Widman, an arbitration practitioner and commentator,
argued that the FAA can be divided into roughly three parts:
§§ 2–4, which cover entering arbitration; §§ 5 and 7, which govern
the arbitration proceeding itself; and §§ 9–11, which cover getting
out of arbitration.138 Prior to Hall Street, the Supreme Court had
primarily addressed the first part—the issues involved in
entering arbitration.139 Hall Street represented one of its first
rulings on the sections dealing with getting out of arbitration, so
it had limited precedent for guidance.140 The Hall Street Court
judicial review authority has been accepted as the law since Wilko v. Swan”).
134. Id. at 585 (“Hall Street sees this supposed addition to § 10 as the
camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting
parties.”).
135. Id. (stating that Wilko cannot be read to create room for extra-statutory
grounds of judicial vacatur).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Stuart M. Widman, Hall Street v. Mattel: The Supreme
Court’s Alternate Arbitration Universes, 15 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 24, 26
(2008) (analyzing Supreme Court FAA precedent pre-Hall Street).
138. See id (parsing the FAA into three main areas of coverage).
139. See id. (citing numerous Supreme Court cases applying or interpreting
§§ 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA).
140. Id. Two exceptions to this general statement are First Options of
Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), and Mastrobuono v. Shearson, Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which both dealt with post-arbitration conflicts.
Widman, supra note 137, at 26 n.5. These cases provided little support for the
Hall Street decision, though, because they were both resolved by deciding issues
presented in the context of entering arbitration: Kaplan revolved around who
could decide arbitrability, and Mastrobuono dealt with choice of law issues. Id.
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was clear in enunciating the “national policy favoring
arbitration”141 that it had espoused in many prior decisions.142
The Court also, however, seemed to break from its previous
position regarding the parties’ power of contract in controlling the
arbitration.143 Although courts make arbitrability decisions under
federal arbitration law,144 the Supreme Court has held that
parties may agree to allow the arbitrator to determine
arbitrability himself if the parties’ agreement on this point is
“clear and unmistakable.”145 Hall Street seems to retreat from the
emphasis on the parties’ agreement inherent in the “clear and
unmistakable” standard and instead sets an impressive roadblock
against parties seeking expanded judicial review of arbitration
awards.146
Widman suggests that this disparate treatment of the
parties’ power of contract may stem from the distinction between
rules governing the arbitration proceeding itself and the rules in
federal courts conducting review of arbitral awards.147 If true,
then the Court may have weighed policy rationales to reach the
Hall Street result: power of contract against finality of arbitration
141. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
142. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
(2006) (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) . . . . Section 2 embodies the national policy
favoring arbitration . . . .”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (stating that there exists a “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements” (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
143. Widman, supra note 137, at 26–27.
144. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) (“[T]he question of arbitrability—whether a collective-bargaining
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—
is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.”).
145. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (“The
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to
arbitration . . . is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably provide otherwise.” (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at
649)).
146. See Widman, supra note 137, at 26–27 (“The Supreme Court signal is
clear, however: Hall Street has pulled back from the power-of-contract rationale
espoused in Howsam and Bazzle.”).
147. See id. at 26 (“Perhaps the Court did not feel that Howsam and Bazzle
applied because they dealt with ‘getting-in’ issues, whereas Hall Street dealt
with a ‘getting-out’ issue.”).
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(an issue that is of less concern when deciding arbitrability itself);
and found finality the more pressing concern.148 It may also be
possible that the Court simply chafed at the idea of private
parties exercising control over the federal judiciary. In the
Supreme Court’s eyes, the FAA’s contractual imperative seems to
end when parties start telling judges what rules they must or
must not apply.
Whatever the Court’s motives for its decision, Hall Street had
an enormous impact on the manifest disregard doctrine.149
Manifest disregard, which had generally been considered an
extra-statutory ground for vacatur,150 appeared dead to many
initial commentators.151 Yet the Court’s equivocal language led
some to believe that the doctrine was not entirely foreclosed.152
148. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)
(“[I]t makes more sense to see the three provisions, §§ 9–11, as substantiating a
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”
(emphasis added)).
149. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Hall Street Court dealt with Hall Street’s manifest disregard argument.)
150. See, e.g., Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir.
2001) (stating that manifest disregard is a “judicially crafted exception to the
general rule that arbitrators’ erroneous interpretations or applications of law
are not reversible” (internal quotes omitted)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (“‘Manifest disregard of
the law’ by arbitrators is a judicially-created ground for vacating their
arbitration award . . . . It is not to be found in the federal arbitration law.”).
151. See, e.g., Albert G. Besser, Arbitration Vacatur: The Supreme Court
Bars One Route and Muddles the Other—Manifest Mistake Is Dead!, 34 VT. B.J.
67, 68 (2008) [hereinafter Manifest Mistake Is Dead!] (“May ‘manifest disregard
of the law’ rest in peace!”); Mauricio Gomm-Santos & Quinn Smith, On
Dangerous Footing: the Non-Statutory Standards for Reviewing an Arbitral
Award, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 353, 367 (2007) (“While proponents of the
standard can point to the use of manifest disregard as a standard of review
throughout the country, the language of the Hall Street decision casts serious
doubt on the logical foundation for the standard’s existence.”); Robert O.
Sheridan, All Almost Quiet on the Expanded Review Front: Supreme Court
Rejects Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93, 107 (2008) (“In striking down ‘manifest disregard,’ the
Hall Street Court struck a blow to Pro-Expansionists.”).
152. See, e.g., Smit, Critical Comment, supra note 25, at 520 (“[T]he
prevailing view appears to be that some form of manifest disregard of the law
currently exists as a ground for judicial review apart from those statutorily
enumerated. Justice Souter’s speculation [in Hall Street] may prove inadequate
to overcome this prevailing view.”); Widman, supra note 137, at 29 (“While it
may be tempting to view Hall Street as a definitive answer, it reflects only, at
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B. The Stolt-Nielsen Decision
The Supreme Court had the chance to bury manifest
disregard once and for all when it agreed to hear Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. The case involved a
direct challenge to an arbitrator’s decision; specifically, the
petitioner challenged an arbitration panel’s determination that
class arbitration was allowable under the parties’ arbitration
agreement, even though both parties stipulated that the
agreement was silent on the matter.153 The case presented a
perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to make a decisive
ruling on manifest disregard because the district court had
actually found the arbitrator’s decision to be in manifest
disregard of the law and had vacated it accordingly.154 But a
decisive ruling was not meant to be.155 Instead, the Court upheld
the district court’s decision without actually pronouncing
anything definitive, or even helpful, about its stance on manifest
disregard.
The petitioners in Stolt-Nielsen were shipping companies,
including Stolt-Nielsen, that had shipped liquids in small
quantities for their customers.156 The petitioners and customers
all used similar or identical maritime contracts,157 which
contained standardized arbitration clauses.158 A Department of
best, a halftime score, with much more left to play.”).
153. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765–66
(2010).
154. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382,
386 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The Court finds, therefore, that the arbitrators manifestly
disregarded a well defined rule of governing maritime law that precluded class
arbitration under the clauses here in issue and that their decision to the
contrary must therefore be reversed.”), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d,
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
155. See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text (explaining StoltNielsen’s holding and treatment of manifest disregard).
156. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
157. See id. at 1764–65 (describing the maritime contracts, or “charter
parties,” used by the parties in this case).
158. See id. at 1765 (giving an example of the arbitration clause found in one
of the common charter parties, the Vegoilvoy charter party). The agreement
stipulated that any dispute would be settled in New York by a panel of three
arbitrators “experienced in the shipping business,” and that the arbitration
would be conducted according to the provisions of the FAA. Id.
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Justice investigation discovered that the petitioner shipping
companies were engaged in illegal price-fixing, and the
petitioners’ customers, including AnimalFeeds, brought suit in
federal court for antitrust damages.159 The Second Circuit ruled
that these claims were subject to the parties’ respective
arbitration agreements; AnimalFeeds and petitioners then agreed
that they would arbitrate their disputes.160 AnimalFeeds,
however, sought to enter class arbitration against all the
petitioners at once.161 If that were allowed, AnimalFeeds would
represent a class of “all direct purchasers of parcel tanker
transportation services . . . from petitioners” at any time during
the price-fixing conspiracy.162
AnimalFeeds and petitioners agreed that their respective
arbitration agreements did not address whether class arbitration
was allowable.163 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,164 which held that, as an
initial matter, the arbitrator decides whether or not an
arbitration agreement allows class arbitration, the issue of class
action arbitrability for the antitrust claims was submitted to a
panel of arbitrators for determination.165 Noting that arbitrators
in post-Bazzle arbitrations had “construed a wide variety of
clauses in a wide variety of settings as allowing for class
arbitration,” and concluding that petitioners’ expert evidence “did
not show an intent to preclude class arbitration,”166 the panel
concluded that class arbitration was permitted under the
arbitration clause and allowed the class action against StoltNielson and the other shipping companies to move forward.167
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85,
87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)).
163. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765
(2010).
164. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). The plurality in that case held
that as an initial matter, the arbitrator determines whether or not an
arbitration agreement allows class arbitration. Id. at 452–53.
165. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765–66.
166. Id. at 1766.
167. Id.
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The shipping companies sought review of this determination
in federal court.168 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York concluded that the arbitrators had “manifestly
disregarded” the clearly applicable law by failing to apply either
the federal maritime principle that precluded class arbitration, or
New York law, which would have incorporated the
aforementioned maritime principle.169 The court found that the
arbitrators had misinterpreted Bazzle170 and failed to do any
meaningful choice of law analysis.171 The contracts at issue were
governed by federal maritime law and New York state law.172
Supreme Court precedent dictates that in admiralty disputes,
courts apply state law unless there is an established federal
maritime rule, which there was in this case.173 Because the
arbitrator panel had applied neither federal maritime law nor
New York law, the court vacated its decision.174
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and ordered denial of
the petition to vacate.175 The appellate court was clear in
168. Id.
169. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386–
87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the arbitrators disregarded two sources of
applicable law), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
The court found that the arbitrators disregarded both an established maritime
rule forbidding class arbitration as well as New York case law, found in Evans v.
Famous Music Corp., 807 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 2004), which held that “industry
custom and practice” should be used when interpreting ambiguous contracts.
Stolt-Nielsen, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. The industry custom in this case would
have been, of course, the maritime prohibition on class arbitration. Id.
170. Id. at 384 (“[The Panel asserts] that resolution of the foregoing issue . . .
is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in [Bazzle] . . . . But, even if, as the
Panel suggests, the parties agree that Bazzle governs the issue, that underlying
assertion is plainly wrong, and no agreement can make it right . . . .”).
171. Id. at 384–85
[T]he Panel, proceeding on the mis-assumption that Bazzle controlled
the issue of whether the clauses here permitted class actions, failed to
make any meaningful choice-of-law analysis but simply made vague
and passing reference to its belief that its analysis . . . is consistent
with New York law . . . and with federal maritime law.
172. See id. at 385–86 (explaining that federal maritime law and New York
state law govern the contracts between the parties).
173. See id. at 385 (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348
U.S. 310, 316–17 (1955)).
174. Id. at 386–87.
175. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 102 (2d Cir.
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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explaining that manifest disregard was still an appropriate
ground for vacatur in the Second Circuit.176 They took issue,
however, with the district court’s application of the manifest
disregard doctrine.177 After analyzing the arbitration panel’s
decision, the court concluded that because “Stolt-Nielsen ha[d]
cited no federal maritime law or New York State law establishing
a rule of construction prohibiting class arbitration where the
arbitration clause is silent on that issue[,] [t]he . . . decision to
construe the contract language . . . to permit class arbitration was
therefore not in manifest disregard of the law.”178
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld
the district court’s initial determination that allowing class
arbitration in this circumstance was improper.179 The Court’s
decision was based on the arbitrators’ failure to properly consult
federal maritime law, New York state law, or the FAA and its
rules of decision.180 The Court chastised the arbitration panel for
“imposing its own policy choice,” and held that it had “exceeded
its powers,” one of the enumerated grounds for vacatur under
§ 10(a) of the FAA.181
This holding seemed to raise more questions than it
answered—chief among them: what about manifest disregard?
The doctrine had been the foundation for both the district court’s
and Second Circuit’s opinions, but it was barely mentioned in
Justice Alito’s majority opinion182 and was completely absent
from Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.183 The majority noted the Second
Circuit’s continued use of the doctrine after Hall Street, and then
cryptically stated in a footnote: “We do not decide whether
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street as an
176. See id. at 93–95 (explaining that the Second Circuit believes manifest
disregard survived the Hall Street decision and remains a viable ground for
vacatur).
177. See id. at 95–101 (analyzing the arbitral award under the Circuit’s
formulation of the manifest disregard standard).
178. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
179. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1777
(2010).
180. Id. at 1770.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1766 (acknowledging that both the district court and Second
Circuit had based their decisions on manifest disregard).
183. Id. at 1777–83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”184 So
not only did the Court refuse to make any pronouncement on the
doctrine’s fate, but also it suggested a possibility completely at
odds with its holding in Hall Street. How could manifest
disregard survive as an “independent ground for review” when
Hall Street explicitly held that there are no grounds for review
independent of §§ 10 and 11?185 To add a final dash of confusion,
the Court ended the footnote by musing that “[a]ssuming,
arguendo, that [manifest disregard] applies, we find it satisfied
for the reasons that follow.”186 So if manifest disregard does exist,
then implicitly the Second Circuit is applying it incorrectly.
The Stolt-Nielsen opinion has been viewed by some courts
and commentators as an approval and application of manifest
disregard by the Supreme Court.187 While a convenient
interpretation for proponents of manifest disregard, it does not do
the opinion justice. The Supreme Court clearly found that the
arbitrators had failed to apply the applicable law. But instead of
finding that the arbitrators recognized a controlling legal
principle and ignored it, the Supreme Court vacated the award
based on the arbitrators’ failure to apply a legal principle from an
appropriate body of law.188 This is not a manifest disregard
standard under any traditional definition.189
184. Id. at 1768 n.3 (majority opinion).
185. See supra notes 129–36 (explaining the holding in Hall Street).
186. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3
(2010).
187. See Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012)
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen closely tracked the
majority of circuits’ approach to manifest disregard before Hall
Street. It noted that there was law clearly on point, that the panel did
not apply the applicable law, and that the panel acknowledged that it
was departing from the applicable law.
See also Sotheby’s Int’l Realty Inc. v. Relocation Group LLC, Civil Action No. 1201322-WGY, 2013 WL 6704876 at *4 n.4 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2013) (“Since the
advent of Hall Street, however, the Second Circuit has interpreted manifest
disregard to be a mere “judicial gloss” on the provisions found within 9 U.S.C.
§ 10. . . . The Supreme Court has expressly declined to temper the Second
Circuit’s appraisal.”).
188. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768–69
Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York
law contains a ‘default rule’ under which an arbitration clause is
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Both the district and appellate opinions also focused on the
parties’ agreement that either federal maritime law or New York
State law governed the issue.190 The Supreme Court noted this
fact,191 but instead decided the case based on the FAA itself.192
Specifically, the Supreme Court cited many of its own decisions
for the general proposition that arbitration is a creature of
contract between the parties, and that the contract serves to limit
the roles of arbitrators and courts.193 From there, the Court
extrapolated the principle that “a party may not be compelled
under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”194
The Court had shifted from Hall Street and seemed to be
operating from a purely contractual viewpoint, pronouncing the

construed as allowing class arbitration in the absence of express
consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a commonlaw court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in
such a situation.
The Court found that instead of looking to governing bodies of law, the
arbitration panel based its decision on a “consensus among arbitrators that class
arbitration is beneficial in a wide variety of settings.” Id. at 1769. The
arbitrators did not intentionally ignore legal principles that they accepted as
governing; they simply did not recognize any governing legal principles at all, so
instead applied their own policy judgment. Id.
189. See supra Part II.C (describing the general manifest disregard standard
and different formulations applied in the federal circuits).
190. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382,
386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (analyzing the dispute under both federal maritime law
and New York State law), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir.
2008) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen’s arbitration brief, which stated that even though
Stolt-Nielsen believed federal maritime law should govern the dispute, and
AnimalFeeds believed New York law should govern, the disagreement should
not make a difference because the result under either law would be the same).
191. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating that the arbitrators should
have resolved the issue by looking “either to the FAA itself or to one of the two
bodies of law that the parties claimed were governing, i.e., either federal
maritime law or New York law”).
192. Id. at 1764 (“We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether
imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on
that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.”).
193. Id. at 1774–75 (quoting numerous Supreme Court cases dealing with
arbitration).
194. Id. at 1775.
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“foundational principle of the FAA that arbitration is a matter of
consent.”195
C. The Current Federal Circuit Split Over Manifest Disregard
So where do Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen leave manifest
disregard? Given that a universally accepted definition of the
doctrine had already proven elusive,196 it should come as no
surprise that these decisions have only exacerbated the problem.
Before Hall Street, all of the federal circuits had (at least
ostensibly) adopted the manifest disregard doctrine. The
Supreme Court’s holding and criticism of the doctrine prompted
several circuits to abandon it altogether. The Fifth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits concluded that Hall Street completely
abrogated the doctrine because it had been viewed as an extrastatutory ground for vacatur.197
Other circuits held fast to the doctrine, most notably the
Second Circuit, as it made clear in its Stolt-Nielsen opinion.198
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have joined its position,
agreeing that manifest disregard can survive Hall Street.199 The
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (summarizing
differences between federal circuits’ applications of manifest disregard).
197. See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner, 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir.
2010) (“Appellant’s claims, including the claim that the arbitrator disregarded
the law, are not included among those specifically enumerated in § 10 and are
therefore not cognizable.”); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324
(11th Cir. 2010) (“We hold that our judicially-created bases for vacatur are no
longer valid in light of Hall Street.”); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562
F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Hall Street unequivocally held that the statutory
grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under the FAA. Our case law
defines manifest disregard of the law as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur.
Thus . . . it is no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA.”).
198. Supra note 176 and accompanying text.
199. See Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]e find that manifest disregard continues to exist either as an independent
ground for review or as a judicial gloss . . . .”); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W.
Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have already determined that
the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is shorthand for a statutory ground
under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which states that the court may
vacate “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v.
WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]his Court will follow its
well-established precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’
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Seventh Circuit has also continued to apply its own extremely
conservative (and probably superfluous)200 form of the doctrine.201
Still other circuits remain understandably perplexed by the
Supreme Court’s confusing treatment of the doctrine, and so have
decided to wait on the sidelines. The First, Third, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits have yet to take a firm stance on whether or not
manifest disregard remains viable.202 This last category of
jurisdictions is the most troubling because the lower courts are
left without guidance and districts within the same circuit reach
opposite conclusions.203
standard.”).
200. See supra notes 105–07 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s extremely
narrow version of manifest disregard).
201. See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281,
285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George Watts & Son,
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may reject an
arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”). The George Watts &
Son standard is articulated supra in note 107.
202. See Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc., 695 F.3d
181, 187 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that the First Circuit has merely expressed in
dicta that manifest disregard does not appear to survive Hall Street); Affinity
Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (refusing to
decide whether manifest disregard survives Hall Street, because the arbitration
award before the court did not rise to the level of manifest disregard); Abbot v.
Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612, 619 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n
the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme Court, we decline to decide
whether the manifest disregard standard should be entirely jettisoned.”); Paul
Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, LLC v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172, 176–77
(3d Cir. 2010) (“In the wake of Hall Street, a circuit split has emerged regarding
whether manifest disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur. This
Court has not yet entered that debate.”).
203. Compare Santomeno v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., Civ. No. 2:12-3782
(KM), 2013 WL 103392, at *8 n.7 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2013) (“Because Hall Street did
not squarely address the issue [of manifest disregard] and the Third Circuit
declined to rule on these common law grounds for review, I will assume that
they survive.”), with Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. SOC-SMG, Inc., Civil Action No.
11-6008, 2012 WL 5232180, at *5 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2012) (“In light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, which held that §10 of the FAA
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur, it appears that manifest disregard is
no longer a viable basis for vacating an award. Accordingly, the Court will not
address this argument.”). Other lower courts waffle like the circuits, treating
claims of manifest disregard with skepticism but refusing to abrogate the
doctrine. See, e.g., FBR Capital Mkts. & Co. v. Hans, Civil No. 13-00535 (RCL),
2013 WL 5665015 at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2013) (“Because the case law controlling
the Court’s reasoning has refused to revive ‘manifest disregard’ since its
apparent death knell in Hall Street, this Court evaluates FBR’s contention with
considerable suspicion.”).
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And what of Stolt-Nielsen’s reference to manifest
disregard?204 Did the Court attempt to resurrect the doctrine from
the shallow grave of Hall Street? Or was the reference merely a
nod to the Second Circuit’s reliance on manifest disregard in its
own Stolt-Nielsen decision?205 Perhaps the Court sought to apply
some altered or veiled form of manifest disregard when it vacated
the arbitrator’s decision.206 Or perhaps the more likely answer is
that the Court applied a different standard of review
altogether.207
So should one care? Is the confusion surrounding manifest
disregard really worth an expenditure of time and effort to
correct? Consider this: In 2012 alone, over three years after Hall
Street supposedly “closed the door” on manifest disregard,208 the
doctrine appeared in 142 federal cases.209 Not surprisingly, the
majority of these cases were in circuits that have expressly held
that manifest disregard is still a viable doctrine.210 Forty-one of
the cases, however, arose in circuits that had yet to determine if
the doctrine survived Hall Street.211 And six of the cases arose in
circuits that have expressly disallowed claims of manifest
disregard.212 The bottom line is that legal and judicial resources
are clearly being spent arguing and analyzing a doctrine without
concrete principles or clear acceptance.
204. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768
n.3 (2010).
205. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96–101
(analyzing Stolt-Nielsen’s claim that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded
governing law).
206. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (“[A]ssuming, arguendo, that
[manifest disregard] applies, we find it satisfied . . . .”).
207. This Note argues that it did. Infra Part IV.C.
208. Sheridan, supra note 151, at 105.
209. The author conducted a search on Westlaw Next in February of 2013
for all federal cases in which “manifest disregard” appeared by typing: “adv:
‘manifest disregard’” into the search bar and counting all cases decided in 2012.
210. These cases occurred in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits in 2012.
211. These cases were found by running a search in Westlaw Next for “adv:
‘manifest disregard’” in the First, Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits and counting
the cases decided in 2012.
212. These cases were found by running a search in Westlaw Next for “adv:
‘manifest disregard’” in the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and counting
the cases decided in 2012.
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This Note proposes a new framework for federal courts213 to
apply when analyzing challenges to awards or decisions of an
arbitrator, when the challenge is based on a claim that the
arbitrator incorrectly applied a legal principle or applied an
incorrect legal principle. This framework is created in an attempt
to harmonize Supreme Court precedent dealing with review of
arbitral decisions and to strike a balance between those who
favor expanded judicial review of arbitral awards214 and those
who argue for extremely limited judicial oversight.215 Regardless
of the chosen framework, though, there should be a final
pronouncement on exactly what manifest disregard means and
whether it is a viable ground for vacatur. As the Supreme Court
itself has stated, “in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”216
IV. A New Framework for Analyzing Challenges to Awards Based
on Alleged Arbitrator Error
The critics of manifest disregard rail against the notion that
courts can engage in substantive review of arbitrators’
decisions.217 They point to the “procedural” nature of the FAA
itself.218 Section 10, which provides the exclusive grounds for
213. See supra note 67 (explaining the difference between arbitral award
challenges in state and federal court, and how those difference affect the
application of manifest disregard).
214. See supra note 24 (listing publications in favor of expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards).
215. See supra note 25 (listing publications opposed to expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards).
216. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (citations omitted).
217. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 45 (“When parties
choose arbitration, the role that the judiciary should seek is no role at all.”);
Davis, supra note 24, at 130 (“[T]he scope of substantive review for arbitration
awards has bred uncertainty among the courts and dismay among litigants
unable to predict what level of review the courts will apply or how they will
apply it.”).
218. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 1, 2 (2009) (“[T]he FAA’s vacatur standards bar courts from secondguessing the substantive correctness of arbitral awards, permitting review only
for procedural irregularities that evince extreme or outrageous conduct, such as
corruption or fraud by one of the parties or the arbitrators.” (citations omitted));
Davis, supra note 24, at 115 (stating the grounds for vacatur in the FAA “limit
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vacatur in federal court,219 does indeed seem to focus its review
on problems with the structure and propriety of the arbitration
proceeding itself, and sanctions vacatur for things like corruption,
fraud, or arbitrator misconduct.220 Many took this focus on the
impartiality and fairness of the proceedings to exclude vacatur
based on the substantive inequities of decisions.221
The Supreme Court’s recent Stolt-Nielsen decision guts that
proposition. The Court never accused the arbitrators of being
corrupt or biased, and no allegations of fraud were made.
Nonetheless, the Court vacated the arbitration panel’s award
under § 10 of the FAA222 because it had “imposed its own policy
choice and thus exceeded its powers.”223 The Stolt-Nielsen
holding, coupled with the rationale of the federal circuits that
decided manifest disregard survives Hall Street as a facet of
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA,224 provide firm support for the availability
of substantive review for arbitral awards.
The form that this review should take is an open question,
though.225 In Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Ginsburg criticized the
majority for basing its ruling, in part, on a distinction between
law and policy that she found absent from the facts of the case.226
the scope of review to issues of gross procedural unfairness”).
219. Supra note 131 and accompanying text.
220. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
221. See Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 147 (1997) (arguing that
review under the FAA should be limited to “the bare essentials needed to afford
due process and to protect the state’s own interests”).
222. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (allowing vacatur where “the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter was not made”).
223. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770
(2010).
224. See Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e conclude that, after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard
of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur because it is a part of § 10(a)(4).
We note that we join the Second Circuit in this interpretation of Hall Street
Associates.”).
225. The current dissonance among the federal circuits provides ample
support that substantive review of arbitral awards is in a very unclear state. See
supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text (outlining the disagreement over
manifest disregard).
226. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
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Substantive review should also not run afoul of the axiom that
review is unavailable for arbitrator’s mere errors in legal
interpretation.227
This Note proposes a framework that attempts to walk the
line between exhaustive substantive review of arbitrators’
application of legal principles and review limited to the
procedural propriety of the arbitration proceeding itself. The goal
is to reconcile concerns about preserving the finality and
expediency of the arbitration process228 with concerns about
potential arbitrator overreaching demonstrated in StoltNielsen.229 It is a series of questions and analyses designed to
determine whether or not the arbitrator applied a legal or
decisional principle from an appropriate body of law, or whether
an extreme form of manifest disregard occurred. If the arbitrator
did apply law from an appropriate source, then any error in her
application would not be a ground for vacatur. If, however, the
arbitrator failed to consult the appropriate set of rules,230 or
exhibited a documented manifest disregard of the controlling
law,231 she would have exceeded her powers under § 10(a)(4) of
the FAA.232
At the outset, it must be made clear to which sort of petitions
for vacatur this framework applies, and to which it does not. This
framework is designed for situations in which a party to the
arbitration proceedings seeks judicial review of the award for
arbitrator error. The claim would involve either intentional
conduct or an honest mistake on the part of the arbitrator. The
framework requires only that the petitioner seek vacatur because
the arbitrator allegedly did not correctly resolve the dispute.233
227. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
228. See Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1245 (Wash. 1995) (“Parties enter
into arbitration agreements for numerous reasons. Among them are to reduce
expenses of litigation and to ensure a speedy and final resolution of their
disputes. The expectation of finality is at the very heart of any arbitration
agreement.”).
229. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (describing how the
arbitration panel exceeded its authority).
230. Infra Part IV.C.
231. Infra Part IV.E.
232. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012) (permitting vacatur when a court finds that
the arbitrator exceeded her powers when crafting the award).
233. However, the petition needs to have a reasonable basis for believing
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Allegations of fraud, partiality, misconduct, or procedural
irregularities would not be evaluated under this framework
because those claims fall under § 10(a)(1)–(3).234
A. Is There a Record of the Proceeding and a Reasoned Opinion? If
not, were a Reasoned Opinion and a Record Required?
As a general rule, arbitrators are under no obligation to
provide a reasoned opinion along with the award.235 The
arbitrator does not need to explain himself; he just needs to
communicate his final decision to the parties. There is also no
general requirement that a record of the proceedings be kept.236
In fact, arbitration organizations discourage written opinions to
help support the finality of arbitration and discourage review.237
If there is no reasoned opinion or record to evaluate, there is little
upon which a reviewing court can base a decision to vacate.238
that the arbitrator has erred in a manner warranting vacatur. Otherwise,
sanctions may be appropriate. See infra Part IV.F.
234. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3).
235. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (“[Arbitrators’ awards]
may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete
record of their proceedings . . . .”); Halligan v Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197,
204 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We want to make it clear that we are not holding that
arbitrators should write opinions in every case or even in most cases.”).
Reasoned opinions contain a determination of governing law and an application
of that law to the parties’ evidence and arguments. Awards without such
opinions merely state the actual award, perhaps accompanied by a brief
statement of facts and the relief requested by the respective parties. Compare
Jamney Montgomery Scott LLC v. Bergdoll, No. 12-0071, 2013 WL 653362
(FINRA) (Feb. 14, 2013) (Crumley, Arb., La Manna, Arb., Mayer, Arb.) (making
an award without a reasoned opinion), with Algonquin Shipping Corp. v. Archer
Daniels Midland Co., SMA No. 4198, 2013 WL 685910 (S.M.A.S.S.) (Feb. 13,
2013) (Martowski, Arb., Siciliano, Arb., Arnold, Arb.) (issuing a reasoned
opinion for the arbitral award).
236. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (noting that arbitrators need not keep a
record of the arbitration proceeding); Downey v. Sharp, 51 A.3d 573, 584 (Md.
2012) (noting that there was no transcript of the arbitration proceedings and
exhibits submitted during the arbitration were not included in the record).
237. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal.4th 362, 395 (Cal.
1994).
238. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (explaining the
difficulties in reviewing an award for error when the arbitrator has not given a
reasoned opinion).
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Some courts have decided to make inferences based on the
record available to them.239 These excursions into the mind of an
arbitrator may stem from judicial suspicion of arbitration itself;240
the sort of suspicion the FAA was created to stop.241 Any
substantive review of arbitral awards must avoid such a
sweeping, speculative inquiry into the rationale and justifications
for an award. Failure to install such a safeguard does violence to
the foundational principle of the FAA: that arbitral awards be
respected and enforced by the courts.242
The Court of Appeals of Maryland243 recently offered a fine
criticism of such inferences in its Downey v. Sharp244 decision.
The lower court had vacated an arbitral award because it found
the award to be “completely irrational.”245 Although the arbitrator
issued a written opinion, the opinion did not explain an apparent
inconsistency contained in the award.246 That court, however, did
239. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998)
(using the lack of a reasoned arbitral opinion as evidence that the arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law).
240. See id.
[W]hen the Supreme Court ruled that an employee could be forced to
assert an ADEA claim in an arbitral forum, the Court did so on the
assumptions that the claimant would not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute, that the arbitration agreement simply
changed the forum for enforcement of those rights and that a
claimant could effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights in the
arbitration. . . . This case puts those assumptions to the test.
(citations omitted).
241. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987)
(“The [FAA] was intended to reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements . . . by placing arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts.” (internal quotes omitted)).
242. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The
preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private
agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . .”).
243. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals was applying its codified
version of the UAA, and not the FAA, the issue remains the same: courts should
not infer arbitrator error from a scant record just because they disagree with or
are confused by the award. Downey v. Sharp, 51 A.3d 573, 575, 583–84 (Md.
2012).
244. 51 A.3d 573 (Md. 2012).
245. Id. at 582.
246. Id. at 577–78 (explaining the irrationality claim). The arbitrator
amended the award to include a phrase implying that the petitioner’s
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not have access to any form of transcript from the proceedings;
none was created.247 The Court of Appeals criticized the lower
court’s determination of irrationality, stating, “without any
knowledge of what was said or submitted at the arbitration
hearing, [the lower court’s determination] might itself be deemed
‘irrational.’”248 The lower court had not only “refused to defer to
the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,” but had
“rendered its own findings of fact and conclusions, which were
contrary to those of the arbitrator.”249 The lower court had
overstepped its bounds.
It should be beyond a court’s authority to vacate awards
based on mere assumptions; if the parties want substantive
judicial review to be available, they need to provide a basis for the
court’s evaluation.250 This means inserting into arbitration
agreements a requirement that arbitrators provide reasoned
opinions for their awards that address both parties’ arguments.251
If a party wants to challenge an award by claiming that the
arbitrator applied an inappropriate legal principle, then a
reviewing court needs to know exactly which legal principle the
arbitrator applied and why she applied it.252 If an opinion does
not exist, then the losing party will just have to live with the
predecessor in title had an express easement through the other party’s land. Id.
at 578. The petitioner argued that this amendment rendered the award
irrational, because in another portion of the award, the arbitrator stated that
the predecessor did not have a valid express easement. Id.
247. Id. at 575–76.
248. Id. at 585.
249. Id.
250. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (“[Because the arbitrators’]
award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a
complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal
meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or
‘material fact,’ . . . cannot be examined.”).
251. In order to facilitate review, the reasoned opinion needs to reflect the
arbitrator’s conclusions regarding both parties’ cases. Otherwise, the arbitrator
could make an improper award and simply not address what should have been
the winning argument. See Halligan v. Piper Jafray, 148 F.3d 197, 199–200 (2d
Cir. 1998) (describing how the correct legal principles were explained to the
arbitrators, who then issued an opinion that did not contain any mention of
them).
252. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (positing that
substantive review is not possible if a reviewing court does not know how the
arbitrator crafted the award).
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award and perhaps insist on reasoned opinions in the future. If a
reasoned opinion and record were required and yet not generated,
then the arbitrator has exceeded her authority under § 10(a)(4).253
B. Which Bodies of Law or Rules Govern the Arbitration?
The arbitrator must resolve a dispute by applying a rule or
principle from a governing body of law.254 This is because through
their submission to arbitration, the parties decide which rules
will be used to settle the disagreement.255 If an arbitrator refuses
to apply a principle from a governing body of law, then the
arbitrator has exceeded her authority under the submission.256
The arbitrator can determine which bodies of law govern the
dispute by looking both to the parties’ contract and to some
default rules.257 The default rules are derived from case
precedent, particularly the Supreme Court’s.258 The key to this
analysis, though, is the parties’ intent.259 Because arbitration is a
contractual form of dispute resolution, the parties have almost260
253. This is because an arbitrator’s failure to follow explicit instructions in
the agreement is a clear violation of § 10(a)(4). See W. Canada S.S. Co. v. Cia.
De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp. 452, 453–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (vacating an
arbitral award because the proceedings were not conducted as specified in the
agreement).
254. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768
(2010) (“Because the parties agreed their agreement was ‘silent’ in the sense
that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration, the
arbitrators’ proper task was to identify the rule of law that governs in that
situation.”).
255. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining that parties to
arbitration may agree on the rules governing the arbitration).
256. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770 (stating that the arbitration panel
exceeded its power by “imposing its own policy choice”).
257. Infra Part IV.C–D.
258. Infra Part IV.C–D.
259. The wrinkle here is that the arbitrator has the authority to determine
the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that arbitrators
are responsible for interpreting the arbitration agreement). This is why the
framework incorporates default rules; the arbitrator and any reviewing court
will assume that the parties implicitly incorporated the default rules into the
contract unless otherwise specified, limiting the arbitrator’s discretion when
determining the governing law.
260. There are a few things parties cannot do through contract. They cannot
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complete control over which issues are arbitrated,261 how the
proceedings are conducted, and which rules are applied.262 The
last pointwhich rules govern the arbitrationis determined
either through the parties’ express direction in the contract itself
or inferences regarding the party’s intent made by resorting to
default standards.263
Broadly speaking, an arbitration proceeding is governed by
two separate kinds of law: substantive law and arbitration law.264
Arbitration law consists of federal arbitration law,265 applicable
state arbitration law,266 and any private arbitration rules chosen
by the parties in their agreement.267 Substantive law consists of
all the rules that may be applied to settle the arbitrable disputes
themselves.268 The distinction is important because the arbitrator
will have to interpret provisions in the agreement to refer either
to substantive law, arbitration law, or both.269
contract for unconscionable or fraudulent proceedings. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)
(allowing arbitration agreements to be voided by generally applicable contract
defenses). They cannot submit issues to arbitration that have been held
inarbitrable (although there are very few disputes that cannot be arbitrated).
See RICHARD A. LORD, 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:28 (4th ed., 2012)
(stating that criminal matters cannot be arbitrated). They also cannot alter the
scope of judicial review under the FAA. See supra notes 129–35 (discussing Hall
Street’s foreclosure of expanded judicial review).
261. See First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (“[T]he
arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute . . . .”).
262. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
263. Infra Part IV.D.2–4.
264. See Gaitis, Clearing the Air, supra note 22, at 33–34 (discussing the
difference between arbitration law and substantive law).
265. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012).
266. This includes both a state’s codification of its arbitration rules, see, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201–3-234 (2012), as well as any other
state law that impacts arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995) (describing the New York case
law forbidding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages).
267. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 61 (analyzing the private arbitration
rules that the parties incorporated into their arbitration agreement, the
National Association of Securities Dealers rules).
268. See id. at 59–60 (distinguishing between substantive rights and
obligations and allocation of power to arbitral tribunals).
269. See id. at 59–60 (positing interpretations of the arbitration agreement
that would incorporate either New York’s substantive and arbitration law, or
merely New York’s substantive law).
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The arbitrator must determine which bodies of substantive
law and which bodies of arbitration law govern the dispute.
Federal substantive law occupies distinct areas of the legal
sphere, and is generally based on statutes.270 Because statutory
rights usually271 can be arbitrated, the arbitrator must determine
if any federal statutes or federal common law govern a dispute.
State substantive law will generally be implicated as well, both
common law and statutory law.272 Only states possessing a
material connection to the dispute are potential sources of
governing rules.273 Federal arbitration law is grounded in the
FAA and is presumed to govern any domestic arbitration dealing
with maritime transactions or interstate commerce.274 This is
because §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA preempt conflicting state law and
§ 2 contains a broad federal pro-arbitration policy.275 States have
their own arbitration law as well, which consists of both state
arbitration statutes similar to the FAA, as well as arbitrationrelated jurisprudence and statutes that affect arbitration
agreements and proceedings.276 Lastly, the parties may choose to

270. See Thomas E. Baker, The Eleventh Circuit’s First Decade Contribution
to the Law of the Nation, 1981-1991, 19 NOVA L. REV. 323, 368 (1994) (“Federal
law is based on statute.”).
271. Not all statutory rights are arbitrable; Congress has the authority to
specify certain statutory claims that cannot be resolved in arbitration and must
be brought in court. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
272. THOMAS A. OEHMKE, 1 COMM. ARB. § 11:2 (2012).
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 cmt. b, c (1971)
(illustrating the reason for conflict-of-law analysis). Also note that while choice
of law provisions make conflict of law analyses easier, state laws are of course
presumed to apply to an arbitration agreement not containing such a provision.
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (“[I]f
a . . . contract . . . had been signed in New York and was to be performed in New
York, presumably ‘the laws of the State of New York’ would apply [to the
arbitration], even though the contract did not expressly so state.”).
274. See Sovak v. Chungai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that there is a “presumption that the FAA supplies the rules for
arbitration”).
275. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (stating that § 2 of the FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy” in favor of
arbitration).
276. Supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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incorporate private arbitration rules, such as the American
Arbitration Association’s.277
Just as the parties may incorporate private arbitration rules
into the agreement, they may also incorporate specific state law
as well. This is done through a choice of law provision in either
the contract or arbitration agreement itself.278 These provisions
dictate which state’s body of law will be applied to disputes
arising under the agreement.279 The parties may also modify their
chosen governing bodies of law by either including or omitting
specific rules.280 Because arbitration is a matter of consent, the
parties are only constrained in their choice of governing rules by
generally applicable contract defenses281 or the inviolability of
statutory rights.282 Notwithstanding those restrictions, the
parties may generally agree to be bound by whatever rules they
see fit.
Arbitrators are bound to enforce choice of law provisions and
apply the law of the chosen state. This may include both the
state’s substantive law and its arbitration law.283 Because the
277. See Rules & Procedures, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, www.adr.org/aaa/
faces/rules (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (describing the American Arbitration
Association’s rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. See Ross Ball, FAA Preemption by Choice-of-Law Provisions:
Enforceable or Unenforceable?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 613, 613 (explaining choice
of law provisions and their relationship to arbitration). Choice of law provisions
are common in arbitration agreements because they remove most of the
uncertainty surrounding which state’s law will be applied to a dispute. See
Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in
Arbitration in the 1990s, 55-JAN. DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 30 (2001) (“Choice of law
provisions are common in arbitration contracts . . . .”); John A. Taylor,
Commercial and Contract Law, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 85, 99 (2008) (noting the
“ever-increasing popularity of forum-selection and choice of law provisions in
contracts”).
279. See Volt Info Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989) (stating that a choice of law provision in the parties’
contract designating California law as governing means that a dispute arising
under the contract will be decided under California law).
280. See W. Can. S.S. Co. v. Cia. De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp. 452,
453 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (describing the arbitration agreement, which contained a
requirement that three arbitrators decide the dispute).
281. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
282. See infra Part IV.D.1 (explaining why statutory rights cannot be
defeated through arbitration agreements).
283. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478–79 (applying both state substantive law and
state arbitration law to the dispute because the Court found that the parties’
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parties have expressly agreed to be bound to that particular
state’s law, the laws of other states that may have otherwise been
implicated are displaced.284 Between federal substantive and
arbitration law, state substantive and arbitration law,285 and any
private arbitration rules or substantive rules the parties have
expressly included in the agreement, the arbitrator often has
numerous sources of governing law from which to choose.286
C. Did the Arbitrator Apply a Principle or Rule from a Governing
Body of Law?
Under this framework, an arbitral award would be vacated if
a petitioning party was able to show that the arbitrator did not
apply a rule or principle from a governing body of law. This rule
is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen. In
that case, the Court vacated an arbitrator’s decision under
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA, declaring that the arbitrators had exceeded
their authority.287 But the Court did not find an excess of
authority under its more traditional formulations,288 nor did the
agreement required applying both).
284. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 812 F. Supp. 845, 846–
48 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (applying New York law even though the petition was filed in
Illinois). Statutory rights, however, cannot be displaced, because these rights
cannot be waived through arbitration. See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig.,
667 F.3d 204, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that statutory claims may only be
arbitrated if the arbitration proceeding can effectively vindicate the statutory
right).
285. Which may or may not be expressly incorporated through a choice of
law provision.
286. Trade customs and international law may also be implicated. THOMAS
A. OEHMKE, 1 COMM. ARB. § 11:2 (2012).
287. Supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
288. Courts have commonly found violations of § 10(a)(4) when arbitrators
decide a dispute that the parties did not agree to submit to arbitration, see
Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Rest. Employees, Local 25, AFL-CIO, 128 F.3d 743,
749 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering
the reestablishment of an employment position when only individual employee
disputes were submitted to arbitration), or when the arbitrator did not follow
specific instructions in the arbitration agreement. See In re Salomon Inc.
S’holders’ Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 1995)
(refusing to send a matter to arbitration because the agreement specifically
required arbitration to be conducted by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the NYSE refused to participate).
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Court’s analysis support a finding of manifest disregard.289 Under
the Stolt-Nielsen decision, arbitrators must consult governing law
and find a principle applicable to the dispute.290 If the arbitrator
fails to do so, she exceeds her authority by acting “as if [she] had
a common-law court’s authority to develop what [she] viewed as
the best rule.”291
The federal policy favoring the finality and expediency of
arbitration dictates that arbitral awards cannot be reviewed for
arbitrator error in applying the law.292 It is not within the
arbitrator’s power, though, to decide sua sponte which body of
law governs the dispute itself, or to make up her own rule.293 This
power rests solely in the hands of the parties who have agreed to
be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. Just as the parties decide
which disputes will be submitted to arbitration, they also decide
which rules will be applied to resolve those disputes.294 Failing to
apply a principle from governing law thus constitutes an
impermissible exceeding of arbitrator authority.295
To determine if an award should be vacated for failing to be
grounded in governing law, an adequate record of the arbitration
proceeding is required.296 This is the only way to determine that
the petitioning party actually argued in favor of applying a
principle from a governing body of law. Challenging an arbitral
award is akin to seeking appellate review of a judgment. The
reviewing court does not necessarily decide the appropriate
289. Supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
290. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1768–69 (2010) (stating that arbitration panel should have consulted governing
bodies of law to see if a “default rule” existed in any of them, which would have
resolved the issue).
291. Id. at 1769.
292. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that “mere allegations of error are insufficient” to warrant award
vacatur).
293. Supra note 291 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that parties control
which rules will govern the arbitration proceeding).
295. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining the holding
of Stolt-Nielsen).
296. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (explaining the
difficulties in reviewing an award for error when the arbitrator has not given a
reasoned opinion).

1620

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571 (2014)

resolution of the dispute, but rather determines if the arbitration
proceedings were conducted correctly.297
A basic tenet of appellate review is the necessity of
presentation: in order for an issue to be addressed on appeal, it
must have been presented to the lower tribunal.298 This rule is
necessary to ensure that adjudicators have all of the relevant
information presented to them and to protect parties from being
blindsided by unknown issues on appeal.299 These same principles
should apply with even more fervor to arbitral award challenges,
because arbitration strives to attain a level of speed and finality
often absent from litigation.300 If an arbitrator is not at least
made aware of the potential applicability of a body of law, then a
party should be prevented from later challenging the award
because that specific law was never applied.
This Stolt-Nielsen-based standard is not particularly high,
and it is intentionally so. A more searching review would
necessarily implicate an arbitrator’s interpretations of the law,
which are not subject to challenge.301 The parties have waived
their right to that level of review.302 In order to successfully
vacate an award under this standard, a petitioning party
normally must demonstrate that the arbitrator did not resort to
any body of governing law.303 But there is one exception.
297. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time within
which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (vacating
the arbitration panel’s decision and remanding the dispute back to arbitration),
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
298. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941) (“Ordinarily an
appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below.”).
299. Id.
300. See supra notes 55, 60, 61 and accompanying text (outlining the goals
and attractive features of arbitration).
301. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th Cir.
2008) (stating that an arbitrator’s “mere error in interpretation or application of
the law is insufficient” to justify vacating the award).
302. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 39 (“[W]hat
happens when an arbitrator demonstrably has blown it? Have parties
consenting to this forum irrevocably bargained for such a result, without
recourse? This writer believes they have . . . .”).
303. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770
(2010) (“[I]nstead of identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the
FAA or either maritime or New York law, the arbitration panel imposed its own
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Sometimes, the arbitrator does not have a completely unfettered
choice between bodies of law: If controlling bodies of law conflict
over the appropriate solution to a dispute, the arbitrator must
perform a conflict-of-laws analysis.
D. Did Governing Bodies of Law Conflict on the Issue Decided by
the Arbitrator? If So, Did the Arbitrator Perform a Conflict of
Laws Analysis?
Suppose now that the arbitrator has encountered a problem:
different governing bodies of law offer conflicting dispositions to
the issue at hand. The parties disagree about which body of law
should control, and they have presented evidence in favor of their
respective positions. Because the arbitrator is bound to apply one
of the governing bodies of law, he must perform a choice of law
analysis.304
A choice of law analysis is a method employed by an
adjudicator to determine which body of law should control a given
dispute. Choice of law is itself a body of law, and each state has
its own choice of law principles that its courts use to resolve
conflicts of law.305 In this Note, the term “choice of law” is used
broadly to include not only conflicts between different states’ laws
but also conflicts between state law and private arbitration law
as well as conflicts between state law and federal law. Because a
choice of law analysis is itself an interpretation of choice of law
principles, an arbitrator’s decision to apply one body of governing
law over another should generally not be reviewable.306
Federal precedent has identified a few key exceptions to this
rule, though, and arbitrators should be keenly aware of them.
Under this Note’s framework, failure to abide by these
established exceptions would be grounds for vacatur.

policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.” (emphasis added)).
304. Supra note 254 and accompanying text.
305. Supra note 273 and accompanying text.
306. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (stating that arbitrators, not courts, should decide “what kind of
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to” because that question depends on
contract interpretation and arbitration procedures).
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Allowing vacatur under those circumstances is premised on
two claims: First, arbitration cannot frustrate statutory rights,
including rights contained in the FAA.307 This rule can trump
even the express provisions in the arbitration agreement.308
Second, whenever the parties’ intent can be found in their
agreement, it must be applied. Not doing so would frustrate the
contractual nature of arbitration.309 When a choice of law analysis
is clearly settled, then the parties incorporate that resolution into
their agreement and the arbitrator is bound to uphold it.
1. First Exception: Frustration of Statutory Rights
The first exception is the most important and trumps any
other considerations. This is because it is based on an absolute
rule: agreements to arbitrate cannot act as waivers of statutory
rights.310 This means that whenever a party arbitrates a dispute
involving a statutory right, the arbitrator is bound to enforce that
right and apply the law governing it. This absolute rule stems
from the prior prohibition on the arbitration of statutory rights.311
For most of its history in this country, arbitration was seen as an
unsuitable forum for such claims.312 Now that the federal policy
307. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”).
308. See infra Part IV.D.1 (explaining the importance of protecting statutory
rights in arbitration).
309. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011)
(“[W]e have repeatedly referred to the Act’s basic objective as assuring that
courts treat arbitration agreements like all other contracts.” (internal quotes
omitted)).
310. Supra note 307.
311. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by
holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the
[Securities] Act.”), overruled by Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
312. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626–27
Some time ago this Court expressed hope for the [FAA’s] usefulness
both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise
created . . . and we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of
the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral
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in favor of arbitration has been clearly established to encompass
statutory rights, courts must ensure that arbitrators enforce
these rights.313
This rule is so important that it can trump the express terms
of the parties’ agreement. The Second Circuit demonstrated this
point clearly with its In re American Express Merchants’
Litigation314 decision. In that case, the court was asked to
consider whether a provision in an arbitration clause that clearly
prohibited class arbitration was valid in light of the plaintiffs’
statutory right to assert claims under the Sherman Act.315
American Express argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stolt-Nielsen rendered class action arbitration waivers
enforceable per se.316 The Second Circuit disagreed and instead
looked to whether the class action waiver would “deprive the
plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”317
Relying on economic evidence, the court concluded that, as a
matter of law, forcing the plaintiffs to bring their Sherman Act
claims individually rather than as a class effectively precluded
them from bringing their claims at all.318 This was because each
plaintiff’s individual claim was far too small to justify the cost of
an arbitration proceeding.319 The court emphasized that while
arbitration can be an “effective vehicle for vindicating statutory
rights,” arbitration is only appropriate if it allows the claimant to
effectively vindicate those rights.320
2. Second Exception: Federal PreemptionState Laws Singling
Out Arbitration
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative
means of dispute resolution.
(internal quotes omitted).
313. See id. at 628 (recognizing that parties’ statutory rights must be
protected in arbitration).
314. 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
315. Id. at 212.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 241.
320. Id.
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The next two choice of law principles (which are subordinate
to the first)321 involve federal preemption of state arbitration law.
Federal law, including federal arbitration law, is the supreme law
of the land and preempts conflicting state law.322 Preemption
occurs when either Congress specifically mandates that a piece of
legislation preempts state law,323 or when preemption is
implied.324 A state law is implicitly preempted when it is either
impossible to comply with both state and federal law,325 or when
the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”326
The FAA has no express preemption language,327 but the
Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating328 that §§ 1
and 2 of the FAA329 preempt conflicting state law.330 Section 1
defines the scope of the Act,331 while § 2 contains the chief
directive of the FAA, mandating recognition and enforcement of
321. This is because although federal preemption principles can be defeated
by the parties’ express agreement, infra Part IV.D.4, statutory rights cannot be
waived by express agreement. Supra Part IV.D.1.
322. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl. 2 (stating that federal law is supreme).
323. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (“Pre-emption
fundamentally is a question of Congressional intent . . . and when Congress has
made its intent clear through explicit statutory language, the court’s task is an
easy one.”).
324. See Drahozal, supra note 42, at 397 (discussing implied preemption and
its two main forms).
325. See id. (finding state law preempted because they were so inconsistent
that it would have been impossible to comply with both (citing Barnett Bank of
Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963))).
326. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
327. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012).
328. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
329. Section 2 makes agreements to arbitrate “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 1 provides the definitions applicable to § 2. Id.
§ 1.
330. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (stating that § 2 of the FAA is a
“substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts,” and that through
it, Congress “intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 n.6 (1989) (“[W]e have held
that the FAA’s ‘substantive’ provisions—§§ 1 and 2—are applicable in state as
well as federal court . . . .”).
331. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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arbitral awards.332 The “federal policy in favor of arbitration” and
the federal substantive case law are derived from § 2.333 State law
holds one powerful trump card over the FAA, though. Because
arbitration is a creature of contract, common contract defenses,
such as fraud and unconscionability, are not preempted and can
invalidate arbitration agreements.334
Cases following Southland established that the FAA
preempts any state law singling out arbitration agreements for
categorical special regulation.335 That preemption principle is
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.336 In Concepcion, the Court held that
a California law invalidating all arbitration agreements
containing collective-arbitration waivers was preempted.337 The
California law declared all such waivers unconscionable, and the
Concepcions argued that the law fit within the saving clause in
§ 2 encompassing unconscionable contracts.338 The Supreme
332. See id. § 2; Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that § 2 of the FAA is the “primary substantive
provision of the Act”).
333. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46
(2006) (stating that the FAA “created a body of federal substantive law,” and the
principle that an arbitration provision is severable from the main contract is
part of that federal substantive law); Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24
(describing § 2 as reflecting a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”).
334. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“A written provision . . . to settle by arbitration
a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon grounds
as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”); Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA].”).
335. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may not, however, invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A state-law
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with the text of 9 U.S.C. § 2.”); Drahozal,
supra note 42, at 408–10 (explaining the relationship between how closely a
state law singles out arbitration and its likelihood of being found preempted by
the FAA); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: An
Overview, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 29 (2001) (“[A] state may not treat an
arbitration contract differently, and particularly less favorably, than other
contracts.” (citations omitted)).
336. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
337. Id. at 1753.
338. Id. at 1746–47; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing that agreements
to arbitrate shall be enforceable except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in
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Court disagreed, and while acknowledging that unconscionability
is a viable ground for a state court to invalidate an arbitration
agreement, the Court also stated that nothing in § 2 should be
construed to “preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”339 Because this law
singled out arbitration agreements and attempted to impose class
arbitration on unwilling parties, it conflicted with a basic goal of
the FAA and was thus preempted.340 The state law was not aimed
at invalidating specific arbitration agreements as unconscionable
under their individual circumstances, but at categorically
invalidating all class-arbitration waivers.
3. Third Exception: Federal PreemptionState Laws Invalidating
Agreements to Arbitrate
State law is also preempted if, although not singling out
arbitration agreements for special regulation, the law still has
the effect of invalidating the agreement to arbitrate. The
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this type of arbitration
invalidation occurred in 2008 with its Preston v. Ferrer341
decision. The case revolved around a dispute between a television
personality and his talent agent.342 Ferrer and Preston had
signed a “personal management” contract, but Ferrer failed to
pay Preston his management fees.343 Preston sought to arbitrate
the dispute, but Ferrer lodged a petition with the California
Labor Commission.344 Ferrer claimed that Preston was actually
operating as a talent agent, and thus was required to possess a
license for such activities under California’s Talent Agencies Act
(TAA).345 He had no license.346 Their contract contained a choice
equity for the revocation of any contract”).
339. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
340. Id. at 1748–49.
341. 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
342. Id. at 350. The personality was Judge Alex Ferrer, the star of a
courtroom television show on Fox. Id.
343. Id. at 350–52.
344. Id. at 350.
345. Id.
346. Id.
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of law provision designating California law as governing, as well
as a provision declaring that any conflict between the agreement
and present or future law should be resolved in favor of applying
legal rules over contractual rules.347
The crux of the case was whether the FAA preempted the
portion of California’s TAA vesting initial adjudicative authority
over talent agency disputes in the California Labor
Commission.348 The TAA required that the Commission would
decide all disputes arising under the Act.349 It did not single out
arbitration agreements for special regulation, but it had the effect
of invalidating, or at least temporarily suspending, the
arbitration agreement until the Commission had rendered its
own decision on the matter.350 So the question before the Court
was not whether the TAA was preempted entirely,351 but whether
the Commission or the arbitrator had the authority to decide
whether Preston was acting as an unlicensed talent agent in
violation of the TAA.352
The Supreme Court held the jurisdictional component of the
TAA preempted.353 Regardless of whether a state law vests
primary jurisdiction over a dispute in a court or an
administrative agency, the effect is the same: any arbitration
agreements covering the dispute are invalidated.354 Ferrer argued
that the jurisdictional grant merely delayed arbitration—that
once the Commission exercised its primary jurisdiction, the
parties were free to compel arbitration.355 The Court rejected his
argument, stating that allowing the Commission to exercise its
jurisdiction
would
frustrate
arbitration’s
“streamlined
proceedings and expeditious results.”356
347. Id. at 361.
348. Id. at 349–50.
349. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (2012) (“In cases of controversy arising
under this chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the
Labor Commissioner . . . .”).
350. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356–57 (2008).
351. Id. at 352.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 349.
354. Id. at 354–55.
355. Id. at 356–57.
356. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-
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4. The Exception to the Federal Preemption Exceptions: Party
Agreement
So if a state law singles out arbitration agreements for
special regulation not applicable to contracts generally, or if a
state law has the effect of invalidating an agreement to arbitrate,
the state law is preempted. The arbitrator cannot apply the state
law if she determines that it fits in one of those two categories.
But because (almost)357 all rules governing arbitration
proceedings must yield to the parties’ intent, the terms of the
arbitration agreement can overcome federal preemption.
The parties are free to choose to apply state law over the
FAA, or even not to apply federal arbitration law at all. The
Supreme Court firmly established this principle in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University.358 That case involved Stanford University’s
alleged breach of its construction contract with Volt, which
contained both a choice of law provision designating California
law as governing and an arbitration clause.359 Volt sought to
compel arbitration under the agreement, while Stanford filed suit
in state court to stay the arbitration proceedings.360 Stanford was
seeking indemnity from two other contractors, whose contracts
with Stanford were not subject to arbitration agreements.361
California law allowed a court to stay compulsory arbitration
proceedings until related litigation between a party to the
agreement and a nonparty had been resolved.362 Volt argued that
the California law was preempted by § 2 of the FAA.363

Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)).
357. The parties still cannot contract their way into waivers of statutory
rights, supra Part IV.D.1, or around common law contract defenses, 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2012).
358. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
359. Id. at 470–71.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 471.
362. Id.
363. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (establishing a federal policy in favor of arbitration);
Volt, 489 U.S. at 474–76; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (giving parties the right to
petition a federal district with jurisdiction over the dispute to enforce their
arbitration agreement).
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The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the university, finding
that the choice of law provision contained in the construction
contract bound the parties not only to California substantive law
but California arbitration law as well.364 The Court focused on the
consensual nature of arbitration.365 “By permitting the courts to
rigorously enforce such agreements according to their
terms . . . we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations
of the parties, without doing violence to the FAA.”366
The crux of Volt was the determination that the parties had
agreed to incorporate California arbitration law into their
arbitration, and not just California substantive law. The core
holding, that parties may override federal arbitration law
through their agreement, is still good law.367 The Supreme Court
has since called into serious question one of Volt’s key premises,
though: the Volt Court’s finding that a standard choice of law
provision merely referencing “the law of the place where the
Project was/is located”368 incorporated into the agreement both
California substantive law and arbitration law.369 This
assumption is probably no longer valid.
The first case to challenge the validity of such an assumption
was Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.370 In that
case, the parties had entered into a contract containing both an
arbitration clause and a choice of law provision designating New
364. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477–79 (1989).
365. See id. at 478 (stating that Congress was motivated in enacting the
FAA “first and foremost” by a “desire to enforce agreements into which parties
had entered”).
366. Id. at 479.
367. See id. (holding that because the parties had agreed to apply California
arbitration law, the California state law at issue was not preempted); FoulgerPratt Residential Contracting, LLC v. Madrigal Condos., LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d
100, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying the arbitration law of the District of
Columbia, and not the FAA, to review an arbitral award because the parties
specifically agreed to be governed by the District’s arbitration law).
368. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
369. See id. at 475 (“[W]e do not think the Court of Appeals offended the
[federal] principle [favoring arbitration] by interpreting the choice-of-law
provision to mean that the parties intended the California rules of arbitration,
including the § 1281.2(c) stay provision, to apply to their arbitration
agreement.”).
370. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
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York state law as governing.371 A dispute arose, the parties
proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrator’s award included
punitive damages.372 Shearson (the losing party) objected to the
award. It claimed that because New York law governed the
dispute, and New York law allowed only courts, and not
arbitrators, to award punitive damages,373 the arbitrator’s award
must be vacated.374
The Supreme Court held the New York ban on punitive
damage awards was not applicable to the arbitration
agreement.375 The Court first acknowledged that its previous
holdings had recognized a federal policy in favor of allowing
punitive damages in arbitration.376 It then turned to the question
of whether or not the parties intended to apply New York’s
arbitration law to their agreement, which would incorporate the
ban on punitive damages.377 The Court read the choice of law
provision to incorporate only New York substantive law as
applied to the contractual relationship itself, and not New York
arbitration law.378 The Court distinguished its dissimilar
interpretation in Volt, explaining that the Volt interpretation
arose from the Court’s deference to a state court’s interpretation
of a contract under its own laws.379 Mastrobuono, however,
involved only federal courts’ interpretations of the contract, so the
Court was not bound to any prior interpretations. The Supreme
Court opined that in order for the choice of law provision to
dictate that state arbitration law applied to the agreement, “New
York law” would have to mean “New York decisional law,
including the state’s allocation of power between the courts and
371. Id. at 54.
372. Id.
373. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (N.Y. 1976) (holding
that arbitrators lack the authority to award punitive damages).
374. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56–57.
375. Id. at 64.
376. Id. at 58 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); and Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), for the proposition that federal arbitration law
allows punitive damages).
377. Id. at 56–57.
378. Id. at 59–60.
379. Id. at 60 n.4.
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arbitrators, notwithstanding otherwise applicable federal law.”380
The Court was not willing to interpret the provision so broadly.381
The Supreme Court continued this interpretive trend in
Preston. Ferrer, the party seeking application of California
arbitration law, relied on the Court’s holding in Volt because that
case upheld the application of a state law delaying arbitration
proceedings pending the outcome of other litigation.382 The Court
rejected his argument and distinguished Volt in two ways. First,
the state law was applied in Volt because third-party proceedings
were involved, and the arbitration agreement did not provide any
guidance on how to handle such a situation.383 The Court used
the state law as “gap filler.”384 Here, in contrast, the agreement
specifically stated that “any dispute . . . relating to . . . the breach,
validity, or legality” of the contract should be resolved by
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).385 Second, the Court cited
Mastrobuono for the rule that when the parties designate both
applicable state law and private rules governing arbitration, the
choice of state law is presumed to only incorporate the state’s
substantive law as applied to the dispute itself, and not the
state’s arbitration law.386 Because the parties had incorporated
the AAA’s arbitration rules, they are presumed not to have
incorporated California’s.387
Two principles can be gleaned from these cases. First, if a
party includes private arbitration rules in their agreement, and
the arbitration rules conflict with governing state arbitration law,
then the private rules control.388 Second, if the parties want state
arbitration to be applied to the exclusion of federal arbitration
law, federal precedent seems to require them to clearly state that
intent in the agreement.389
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 60.
Id.
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 360–61 (2008).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 362–63.
Supra note 387 and accompanying text.
See Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002)
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The current condition of federal arbitration law preemption
is sadly unpredictable, though, and these two principles are not
completely reliable at this point. This is because interpreting
choice of law provisions is up to the court in which the petition for
confirmation or vacatur is filed,390 and the petitions are often filed
in state court.391 A state court may determine that a general
choice of law provision shows that the parties intended to apply
that state’s arbitration law instead of the FAA.392 When
confronting a choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement,
an arbitrator cannot know with certainty whether a reviewing
court would find the provision to override federal arbitration law.
The Supreme Court has indicated that a choice of law provision
that does not expressly refer to a state’s arbitration law should
not be construed to trump the FAA.393 Because choice of law
provisions are often fairly standardized in arbitration
agreements, sound judicial policy dictates that the provisions be
uniformly interpreted.394 As a matter of federal arbitration law,
choice of law provisions in arbitration agreements not mentioning
arbitration law should not evidence the parties’ intent for state
(“[A] general choice-of-law clause within an arbitration provision does not trump
the presumption that the FAA supplies the rules for arbitration.”); Roadway
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] generic
choice-of-law clause, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that
contracting parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards.”); Jung v.
Am. Assoc. of Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The intent of
the contracting parties to apply state arbitration rules or law to arbitration
proceedings [and not to apply the FAA] must be explicitly stated in the contract
and . . . a general choice of law provision does not evidence such intent.”).
390. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 n.4
(1995) (stating that the Court in Volt adhered to the state court’s interpretation
of the parties’ contract). The Supreme Court in Mastrobuono was reviewing a
federal court’s interpretation of a contract containing a nearly identical choice of
law provision to the one found in Volt. The Court reached the opposite
conclusion in Mastrobuono as it did in Volt because it did not owe deference to a
state court’s interpretation of a contract interpreted under its own laws.
Drahozal, supra note 42, at 413.
391. Drahozal, supra note 42, at 413 & n.152.
392. Id. at 412.
393. Supra note 390.
394. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039,
1048 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[B]oilerplate must be distinguished from contractual
provisions which are peculiar to a particular [agreement] and must be given a
consistent, uniform interpretation.”).
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arbitration law to override federal. Without this key assumption,
the federal preemption exceptions described in this Note395 are on
unstable ground, and thus cannot serve as reliable guidance for
arbitrators when interpreting agreements, or for courts reviewing
arbitral awards under Part D of this framework.396
E. Did the Arbitrator Correctly Identify a Legal Principle as
Controlling, and Yet Refuse to Apply It?
This question preserves the manifest disregard doctrine in a
very narrow form. If the arbitrator, in a reasoned opinion,
correctly states a governing legal principle but refuses to apply it,
then she has exceeded her authority under the parties’
submission and the award can be vacated under § 10(a)(4).397 If
vacatur is to be allowed when attacking an award because it was
395. Supra Part IV.D.2–3. The “frustration of statutory rights” exception,
explained supra Part IV.D.1, is unaffected by interpretation of choice of law
provisions, because this exception can defeat even the parties’ express
agreement.
396. The federal preemption exceptions (to the general rule that arbitrators’
conflict-of-law decisions are not reviewable) would be nullified because they are
based on the premise that the law in this area is settled, that the parties knew
the law was settled when they drafted the arbitration agreement, and that they
incorporated the settled law into the agreement. Supra note 309 and
accompanying text. If the meaning of a generic choice of law provision is not
settled in favor of the Supreme Court’s approach, then the only exception
remaining would be the “frustration of statutory rights” exception, described
supra Part VI.D.1.
397. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d
Cir. 2008)
[W]e view the “manifest disregard” doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a
mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather
than as judicial review of the arbitrators’ decision. We must therefore
continue to bear the responsibility to vacate arbitration awards in the
rare instances in which the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal
principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the
disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by
refusing to apply it. . . . At that point the arbitrators have failed to
interpret the contract at all, . . . for parties do not agree in advance to
submit to arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the
law. Put another way, the arbitrators have thereby “exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012)).
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premised on an incorrect body of law, then logically vacatur must
also be available when an arbitrator intentionally refuses to
apply governing law correctly. Vacatur for failing to apply
governing law is based on the premise that arbitrators are
constrained by the parties’ submission; they must apply the
bodies of law specified or implied in the agreement.398 If, however,
arbitrators could apply the governing bodies of laws in any way
that they wished, including incorrectly, then why bother
requiring them to apply those laws at all?
By adopting this restricted form of manifest disregard, the
courts can prevent a severe and extremely rare form of arbitrator
misconduct.399 In all likelihood, this rule is a completely
preventative measure and may never actually be used to
facilitate vacatur. When coupled with the first piece of the
framework, the reasoned-opinion requirement, the rule produces
a situation highly unlikely to produce actual violations. If a
reasoned opinion were a prerequisite for any substantive
review,400 then any arbitrator bound to create such an opinion
would probably never openly admit to intentionally ignoring the
governing law or draft an opinion that is clearly inconsistent with
the requisite legal principles.401 So the manifest disregard rule
398. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
399. See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 91–92 (“The ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine
allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award only in ‘those exceedingly
rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators
is apparent.’”).
400. Supra Part IV.A.
401. Finding an actual incident where an arbitrator admitted to ignoring
governing law is extremely difficult. A fairly close example can be found in
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P., 813
A.2d 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). In that case, an unlicensed medical
diagnostic-testing facility performed a procedure on a patient after getting a
letter from the state warning the facility that it could not perform any testing
services until it received the license. Id. at 622–23. The license was later
granted, but the patient’s insurance company refused to pay the claim, because
under New Jersey law no duty exists to pay for unlicensed medical services. Id.
at 623–24, 626. The arbitrator recognized this law, but determined that because
the license was “in flux” at the time the services were performed, and ultimately
granted, the insurance company had to pay up. Id. at 623–24. The Superior
Court vacated the award for manifest disregard of the law, stating, “If an
arbitrator can issue an award to an unlicensed medical practitioner who has
been warned by the Department of Health that he could not operate until the
license is issued, the arbitration process is a sham!” Id. at 633.
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here is prophylactic: it aims to keep arbitrators applying the rules
chosen by the parties, even if the arbitrator does not agree with
the result and would prefer applying different standards.
F. If the Arbitrator Committed No Legal Error Warranting
Vacatur, Did the Petitioning Party Have a Reasonable Basis for
Believing Such an Error Existed?
This final question serves as the floodgate for this
framework. Many of the staunchest opponents of manifest
disregard and substantive review of awards claim that the ability
to seek such review opens arbitration to prolonged, frivolous
litigation.402 A losing party may use the threat of litigation to
negotiate a more favorable position and diminish its own losses
from an adverse award. An extremely disgruntled party could
simply employ substantive challenges to make confirmation
difficult and costly for the opposing side. “Finality” needs to have
some teeth.
Substantive review of arbitral awards should be reserved
only for instances of clear manifest disregard403 or awards not
grounded in governing law.404 If a party challenging an award has
no good faith basis for believing that such a deficiency in the
award exists, then that party is abusing both the court system
and arbitration as a whole. Measures must be put in place to
strongly discourage such behavior.
This Note proposes the aggressive use of sanctions as a
means to stem abusive substantive challenges to arbitral awards.
The Eleventh Circuit has already proposed this solution. In its
B.L. Harbert International, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co.405
decision, the court posited that sanctions should be imposed on
parties attacking arbitration awards in court without a legitimate
legal basis for doing so.406 In justifying this position, the court
explained that
402. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 45 (claiming that
the manifest disregard standard is “an open invitation to litigate forever”).
403. Supra Part IV.E.
404. Supra Part IV.B–D.
405. 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006).
406. Id. at 913–14.
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[t]he laudatory goals of the FAA will be achieved only to the
extent that courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to
litigation, not an additional layer in a protracted contest. If we
permit parties who lose in arbitration to freely relitigate their
cases in court, arbitration will do nothing to reduce congestion
in the judicial system; dispute resolution will be slower instead
of faster; and reaching a final decision will cost more instead of
less.407

Sanctions were not actually imposed in that case, though,
because the court did not find that the challenge rose to the
requisite level of frivolousness.408
Under the proposed framework, a few clear instances of
abusive challenges can be readily anticipated. Asserting a
substantive challenge to an award409 when no reasoned opinion or
record of the proceedings exists and was not required should be
per se abusive.410 A challenge based on failure to apply governing
law also should be conclusively abusive if the arbitrator applied a
principle from any body of governing law.411 If governing bodies of
law conflicted, and this conflict was presented to the arbitrator,
then a challenge to the resulting award would be abusive if the
arbitrator conducted a conflict-of-laws analysis412 and did not
violate one of the three exceptions listed in Part IV.D.413
Aggressively enforcing sanctions for abusive filings would
compel losing parties to only assert challenges that they believed
entertained a reasonable likelihood of success. Because the
framework proposed here allows very limited review, the
implication is that few challenges would meet that benchmark.
Disappointed parties with little ground for substantive review
would be forced to simply cut their losses and pay the award, and
arbitration would retain its speed and finality.

407. Id. at 907.
408. Id. at 914.
409. Either a claim that the arbitrator did not apply a rule from a governing
body of law, supra Part IV.C–D, or a claim of the restricted manifest disregard
standard outlined above, supra Part IV.E.
410. Supra Part IV.A.
411. Supra Part IV.C.
412. Supra Part IV.D.
413. Supra Part IV.D.1–4.
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VI. Conclusion
Manifest disregard has a turbulent history and is currently
in a state of limbo.414 The Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision
has cast serious doubt on the doctrine’s viability as an extrastatutory ground for arbitral award vacatur.415 Many
commentators, invoking the federal policy in favor of arbitration
and its stated goals of expediency and finality, have called for the
complete abrogation of manifest disregard.416
Many federal circuits refuse to let the doctrine die, though.
Fueled by the Supreme Court’s strange and unprecedented
holding in Stolt-Nielsen, which clearly endorsed some form of
substantive review of arbitrators’ decisions,417 four circuits have
concluded that the doctrine survives Hall Street as a formulation
of one of the enumerated grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA.
This inconsistency in federal vacatur law is unsatisfactory, and
definitive resolution is required.418
Manifest disregard has been tested and found wanting.419
First of all, the doctrine is overbroad and gives a reviewing court
power to vacate awards without a sound basis for doing so.
Current formulations of the doctrine allowing a court to infer an
arbitrator’s knowledge or intent pose an unacceptable risk that
substantive challenges will be made available to any losing party
in an arbitration proceeding.420 The solution is to either eliminate
414. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (describing the current
state of manifest disregard among the federal circuits).
415. See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text (describing Hall
Street’s effect on the manifest disregard doctrine).
416. See supra note 151 (listing commentators who believed that Hall Street
signaled the end of manifest disregard).
417. See supra notes 287–91 and accompanying text (explaining the
substantive arbitral award review granted by the Supreme Court in StoltNielsen).
418. See supra notes 208–12 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
frequency with which manifest disregard is asserted in federal court challenges
to arbitral awards, even in courts that have not determined the doctrine’s
viability).
419. See supra notes 240–49 and accompanying text (explaining why
allowing courts to divine arbitrators’ knowledge and intent without a written
opinion is undesirable); supra notes 196–212 and accompanying text (describing
the current confusing state of manifest disregard).
420. See supra notes 85–87, 89–90, 103 and accompanying text (listing the
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the ability of courts to make that inference,421 or to foreclose
substantive review entirely.422 The Supreme Court has rejected
the latter contention in its Stolt-Nielsen decision,423 so the logical
solution is to allow substantive review only when a complete
record of the arbitration proceeding and a reasoned opinion are
available.424
Manifest disregard is also underinclusive. Despite the
Supreme Court’s musings,425 the type of review granted in StoltNielsen does not fit within manifest disregard.426 The StoltNielsen court did not find that the arbitrators identified
governing legal principles and ignored them.427 Instead, the Court
vacated the arbitrators’ award because the arbitrators failed to
identify the governing legal principles in the first place.428 The
Second Circuit applied its formulation of manifest disregard, and
it correctly concluded that there was no evidence that the
arbitrators intentionally ignored governing law.429
The framework proposed by this Note attempts to harmonize
the Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen decisions, and also to provide a
new way of looking at substantive judicial review of arbitral
awards. It allows vacatur when a party can show that the
arbitrator did not apply a legal principle from the governing law
designated by the parties, or that the arbitrator intentionally
refused to apply clearly governing law.430 It includes procedural
safeguards to prevent abuse and preserve arbitration’s speed and
finality.431 The most important purpose of this Note, though, is to
federal circuits that currently allow courts to infer an arbitrator’s knowledge or
intent).
421. Supra Part IV.A.
422. See Besser, Manifest Mistake Is Dead!, supra note 151, at 68 (“If the
parties really want to preserve a right to appeal an arbitration award on
traditional grounds, they might just as well litigate.”).
423. See supra notes 217–24 and accompanying text (explaining why StoltNielsen sanctions limited substantive review of arbitral awards).
424. Supra Part IV.A.
425. Supra note 186 and accompanying text.
426. Supra Part IV.C.
427. Supra note 188 and accompanying text.
428. Supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text.
429. Supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
430. Supra Part IV.C–E.
431. Supra Parts IV.A, IV.F.
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suggest a dialogue about how judicial review of arbitral awards
should look in the wake of Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen. This
Note is not the complete solution, but rather a call for a coherent,
predictable federal framework for analyzing substantive
challenges to arbitrator decisions.

